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  INTRODUCTION   
The American law of church and state is in the midst of a 
significant transformation. In the area of government funding 
for religious organizations, the Supreme Court has moved from 
a rule that generally disallowed direct government funding of 
churches to a rule that requires it in certain circumstances.1 In 
relation to government religious expression, the Court has sug-
gested that regulating sectarian speech in public settings might 
violate free exercise rights when previously it had held that the 
Establishment Clause limits government speech.2 And, in the 
context of religious accommodations, the Court for the first time 
extended the right of free exercise to for-profit corporations.3 So, 
too, the Court for the first time invalidated application of a civil 
rights law to a for-profit business,4 raising significant questions 
about whether religious exemptions might be used to undermine 
decades of precedent governing equal access to the market.5  
The most immediate cause of these legal developments is 
the changing composition of the Supreme Court.6 Coinciding 
 
 1. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of 
the Establishment Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 723–30 (2002); Douglas Lay-
cock, Churches, Playgrounds, Government Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 133 (2017); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Trinity Lutheran Church v. 
Comer: Paradigm Lost?, in AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
2016–2017, at 131 (2017). Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606–07 
(1971) (finding statutes that provide financial support to religious schools un-
constitutional), with Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 
(2017) (allowing a church to receive public benefits). 
 2. Compare Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 
(2019) (holding that using a cross in a WWI memorial on public land is consti-
tutional), and Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (holding that 
a town beginning board meetings with a prayer is not a violation of the Consti-
tution), with McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851, 881 (2005) 
(holding that the display of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse violates 
the Constitution when the purpose for hanging them is religious).  
 3. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).  
 4. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018).  
 5. See Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 154 (2018); Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 
831–34 (2019); Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
1453 (2015). 
 6. Justice O’Connor’s retirement and replacement by Justice Alito has 
moved the Court’s Religion Clause doctrine visibly to the right. Unlike Justice 
O’Connor, Justice Alito has never voted to limit government support for religion 
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with recent judicial appointments, however, is an emerging in-
tellectual and ideological critique of the twentieth century 
church-state settlement. We call this critique religious antiliber-
alism. We argue that the Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence 
has begun to reflect certain aspects of this critique, that the 
twentieth century church-state settlement is unstable, and that 
antiliberal views are likely to influence the development of legal 
doctrine going forward.  
The history of antiliberalism can be traced to counter-En-
lightenment reactions to the emergence of liberal political theory 
and liberal institutions, especially in the aftermath of the French 
Revolution.7 But the more recent rise of populist and authoritar-
ian regimes worldwide has coincided with renewed criticisms of 
liberalism, especially from religious conservatives.8 To be sure, 
scholars and partisans on both the left and the right have long 
 
under the Establishment Clause, see Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1831 (Alito, 
J., concurring) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to legislative prayer 
practice); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125 (2011) (dis-
missing case for lack of taxpayer standing to challenge tax credits for violating 
establishment clause); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587, 
592–93 (2007) (restricting taxpayer standing to raise Establishment Clause 
challenges), and, until this Term, he never voted to reject a religious exemption 
claim, see Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(joining Justice Gorsuch’s opinion that would grant free exercise challenge to 
application of state public accommodations law); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 
859 (2015) (granting Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ex-
emption from prison grooming policy); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 688–91 (grant-
ing exemption under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to for-profit corpo-
ration from contraception mandate); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 198–99 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(grounding the ministerial exception to antidiscrimination law in the Religion 
Clauses). But see Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 661 (2019) (mem.) (rejecting a 
Muslim prisoner’s Establishment Clause challenge to Alabama’s practice of al-
lowing a Christian chaplain to administer last rites within an execution cham-
ber but prohibiting Islamic clergy from doing the same).  
Justice Kennedy’s retirement and replacement with Justice Kavanaugh 
will also likely contribute to the growing alignment of Religion Clause doctrine 
with the views of social conservatives, which has been a long-term goal of a vocal 
faction within the Republican Party. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, 
Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 
124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2544–52 (2015) (discussing political mobilization by reli-
gious conservatives within the Republican Party).  
 7. See generally STEPHEN HOLMES, THE ANATOMY OF ANTILIBERALISM 
(1993) (discussing the origins and history of antiliberal political thought).  
 8. See infra Part II. 
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berated liberalism for its supposed failures. For Marxist and so-
cialist critics, classical liberalism stands for the exploitative 
market economy with its emphasis on individual property rights: 
the invisible hand of Adam Smith turned into the industrial 
economy. Its neoliberal variant is criticized for causing massive 
economic inequality.9 For non-Marxist critics, the rise of liberal-
ism is blamed for the decline of religion, the fraying of traditional 
morality, the rejection of communal ties, the epidemic of social 
alienation, the obsession with materialism and consumerism, 
and the rise of modern statism with its inevitable collapse into 
fascism or communism.10 
Liberalism is often ill-defined. Most critics agree, however, 
that liberalism is a political, economic, and social theory of per-
sonal autonomy, rights (property and otherwise), a distinction 
between public and private spheres, religious toleration (if not 
religious neutrality), and the rejection of rule based on inherited 
authority and tradition. John Locke, Adam Smith, James Madi-
son, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill feature prominently 
within the liberal tradition.11 John Rawls is the most important 
twentieth-century liberal philosopher.12 
Antiliberalism is a comprehensive critique. It is not re-
stricted to any one area of law, politics, or society. In this Article, 
however, we examine the confluence of antiliberal thought and 
the changing face of church-state jurisprudence, where religious 
 
 9. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S 
STEALTH REVOLUTION 28–29 (2015); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 237–70 (Arthur Goldhanner trans., President & Fel-
lows of Harvard Coll. 2014) (2013); David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, In-
troduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 20–21 (2014). 
 10. See, e.g., PATRICK J. DENEEN, WHY LIBERALISM FAILED (2018); 
RYSZARD LEGUTKO, THE DEMON IN DEMOCRACY: TOTALITARIAN TEMPTATIONS 
IN FREE SOCIETIES (2016); STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE 
CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018).  
 11. See JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM (1986); ALAN RYAN, THE MAKING OF MOD-
ERN LIBERALISM (2012); Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberal-
ism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127 (1987); Gerald Gaus et al., Liberalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPE-
DIA PHIL. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ 
liberalism/ [https://perma.cc/2VLZ-TAFF]. 
 12. See Samuel Freeman, Introduction to THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
RAWLS 1 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy, Introduc-
tion to A COMPANION TO RAWLS 1 (Jon Mandle & David A. Reidy eds., 2014). 
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 2005) 
[hereinafter RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].  
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antiliberalism might naturally find a home. Antiliberal thought 
has a long pedigree, and our main purpose here is neither to re-
cover nor to critique it, but rather to show how certain forms of 
criticism inspired by it might be relied upon to justify shifts in 
the doctrine of church and state. That doctrine has become more 
favorable toward religion, especially Christianity, at least with 
respect to winners and losers in the Supreme Court.  
Our focus here is on the revival of non-Marxist, religious an-
tiliberalism. These critics of liberalism tend to use language that 
suggests that liberalism acts as an agent—that it is responsible 
for bringing about changes in policy and institutions. Antiliber-
als often make causal claims about what liberalism has wrought, 
but, as Cass Sunstein has recently observed, liberalism is a set 
of ideas, not an agent.13 The same is true of antiliberalism. Thus, 
our focus is mainly conceptual and normative, rather than 
causal. Our claim is that certain political and legal changes can 
be understood in terms of antiliberal ideas, not that those ideas 
caused the relevant changes.  
If antiliberal thought does not provide a causal explanation 
for recent political and legal developments, it can nevertheless 
serve to justify those developments. In relation to the law of 
church and state, the new antiliberalism’s doctrinal goals are of-
ten consistent with the goals of many religious conservatives 
more generally, including broad autonomy for religious institu-
tions and persons through religious exemptions from general 
laws; public funding of churches and religious organizations 
through vouchers or direct grants; acceptance of majoritarian 
public religious expression and displays, including in some cases, 
a return to school prayer; and the legitimacy of state-enforced 
moral codes based on religious principles.14  
Some of these changes in legal doctrine can be interpreted 
and defended under liberal principles.15 A liberal political order 
 
 13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Ismism, Or Has Liberalism Ruined Everything? 
6 (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 19-19, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3372364 (“[L]iberalism is not a person or an agent. 
It is a constellation of ideas.”).  
 14. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 267–82, 304–33; STEVEN D. SMITH, THE 
RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 142–58 (2014). 
 15. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELI-
GIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 201–04 (2007) (giving a qualified de-
fense of equal funding of religious organizations under a liberal egalitarian the-
ory); IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, AND 
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is compatible with a range of permissible church-state relations, 
including regimes that provide legal exemptions for conscien-
tious objectors16 and funding on equal terms for religious 
groups.17 For that reason, we expect that church-state adjudica-
tion will continue to be dominated by principles of fairness, neu-
trality, and equality. The current Court has not rejected the lan-
guage of liberalism, at least not rhetorically.18  
Nevertheless, we argue that the application of liberal prin-
ciples—including non-discrimination, religious neutrality, and 
requirements of private choice—is under significant stress. 
While particular doctrines governing religious exemptions, state 
funding, or government speech might be justifiable along liberal 
lines, the overall pattern and trajectory of the emerging church-
state legal regime conflicts with liberal values and commit-
ments. There is an inescapable sense that even bedrock princi-
ples—that government cannot favor one religion above others, 
for instance19—are subject to revision in light of criticisms that 
arise from a very different intellectual tradition. For that reason, 
the future of the Court’s church-state jurisprudence is in ques-
tion. What will the doctrine look like in the coming decades? Re-
 
RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 54–61 (2014) (justifying the ministerial exception for reli-
gious organizations on the basis of the secular state’s incompetence to decide 
ecclesiastical questions); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 347–49 (1996) (defending religious exemptions 
and equal funding on grounds of religious neutrality). 
 16. With respect to religious exemptions, one of us has argued that a regime 
that also extends exemptions to nonreligious claims of conscience can be de-
fended on liberal grounds. Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1085, 1099–101 (2014); see also CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERAL-
ISM’S RELIGION 34–35, 203–25 (2017); cf. NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE 76–77 (2017) (arguing constitutional law requires, in 
some situations, religious exemptions to be extended to nonreligious actors to 
preserve equality). But exemptions for religious and conscientious objectors 
must be limited so that they do not impose significant burdens on third parties. 
Micah Schwartzman et al., The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY. L.J. 781 (2017–18). 
 17. See Cécile Laborde, Political Liberalism and Religion: On Separation 
and Establishment, 21 J. POL. PHIL. 67, 67 (2013) (arguing that political liber-
alism, at least in its received form, is indeterminate about many controversies 
involving separation and disestablishment). 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); see also 
Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the 
Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1097, 1119–20 (2006). 
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ligious antiliberalism gives us a clue, for it seems to be an as-
cendant voice, in part because of the Court’s increasingly con-
servative trajectory. 
This Article makes three contributions: theoretical, doctri-
nal, and political. First, it describes four strands of religious an-
tiliberalism. Some versions may be compatible with disestablish-
ment, though others are frank in their advocacy of a religious 
state. All share a deep distrust of the Court’s twentieth century 
church-state settlement.20 Second, the Article discusses the con-
ceptual incoherence of the Court’s contemporary church-state 
doctrine, with special attention to the Court’s recent cases in-
volving the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. We argue 
that the critique of liberalism provides resources to a newly con-
servative court seeking to remake constitutional doctrine. An-
tiliberal thinkers are explicit about this project, and their cri-
tiques are often directed at the Court. Third, the Article 
considers the future of church-state separation as a matter of 
political economy. The global critique of liberalism is gaining 
traction as liberal democratic regimes around the world are un-
der threat from populist and reactionary forces, including in the 
United States.21 We argue that the fact of American religious 
pluralism—which is commonly invoked as the guarantor of dis-
establishment—will not halt the political and doctrinal momen-
tum toward Christian preferentialism.  
Part I sets the stage by describing the basic contours of a 
liberal account of church and state. Such an account relies on a 
distinction between religious and secular law and demands state 
neutrality among religious denominations and between believ-
ers and non-believers. For many readers, these liberal commit-
ments will be familiar, though how they have been applied in 
specific legal controversies has always been contentious.  
Part II then introduces the critics, tracing the antiliberal 
tradition in church and state, with specific focus on recent com-
mentary pertinent to the law of religious freedom. A recurring 
theme in antiliberalism’s revival is that liberalism is a “religion” 
 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See ROGER EATWELL & MATTHEW GOODWIN, NATIONAL POPULISM: THE 
REVOLT AGAINST LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, ANTI-PLU-
RALISM: THE POPULIST THREAT TO LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2018); JAN-WERNER 
MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? 50–60 (2016). 
  
1348 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1341 
 
that generates its own orthodoxy.22 On this account, disputes 
over the Religion Clauses do not pit religious traditionalists 
against a secular state but instead involve a face-off between two 
religious traditions. Church-state doctrine thus needs to be 
reimagined. Some argue that, at a minimum, a new bifurcation 
between church and state has to be constructed based on insti-
tutional spheres of authority, with churches as sovereign powers 
independent of the state.23 At the more radical extreme, some 
claim that we should reject the entire idea of church-state sepa-
ration in favor of an explicitly religious state.24 
Part III describes how the Supreme Court has changed the 
doctrinal valence of liberal principles in church-state jurispru-
dence over the course of the last quarter century. Recent deci-
sions under the Religion Clauses, including Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission25 and 
Trump v. Hawaii,26 recite the themes of “neutrality,” “general 
applicability,” “equal treatment,” and “animus,” but how those 
concepts have been applied has shifted significantly over time. 
Of course, the terminology of fairness and impartiality has al-
ways been contested. This is particularly so in Religion Clause 
jurisprudence, where the Court has sought to maintain neutral-
ity between religious actors and their secular counterparts while 
 
 22. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 10, at ix–x; Adrian Vermeule, Liturgy of 
Liberalism, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 2017), https://www.firstthings.com/article/ 
2017/01/liturgy-of-liberalism [https://perma.cc/9U44-GFMX] (reviewing 
LEGUTKO, supra note 10). 
 23. See Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?, 
in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 249, 
249–50 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); see also Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Mat-
ter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. 
L. REV. 273, 295 (2008); Paul Horwitz, Church as First Amendment Institutions: 
Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2009). 
 24. See Thomas Pink, In Defense of Catholic Integralism, PUB. DISCOURSE 
(Aug. 12, 2018), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/08/39362/ [https:// 
perma.cc/U8NA-KMQJ]; Adrian Vermeule, A Christian Strategy, FIRST THINGS 
(Nov. 2017), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/11/a-christian-strategy 
[https://perma.cc/HY34-YD3P]; see also Graham Walker, Illusory Pluralism, In-
exorable Establishment, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF 
FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 111, 118–23 
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000). 
 25. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).  
 26. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
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simultaneously preserving religion’s favored status.27 The new 
religious antiliberalism does not solve this dilemma; indeed, it 
rejects the enterprise altogether.  
As doctrine collapses, what takes its place? Part IV ad-
dresses the future of church-state jurisprudence in light of the 
antiliberal ascendance. Here we treat antiliberalism as both an 
intellectual critique and a political movement. The conventional 
political economy story suggests that in a religiously pluralistic 
society where Protestant-Catholic divisions are no longer domi-
nant, the public will support evenhanded funding of religious or-
ganizations but not overt government endorsement of religion or 
religious preferentialism.28 The Court’s doctrine, on this view, 
tends to follow social fault lines. 
But this story no longer captures the terrain of the religious 
culture wars. First, the response to radical Islam and the back-
lash against Muslim and other forms of ethnic migration has 
fueled the rise of Christian nationalism across western societies, 
including in the United States.29 Second, in response to the sex-
ual revolution and the recent recognition of LGBT rights, evan-
gelicals, conservative Catholics, and other religious traditional-
ists have joined forces to advance a conception of religious liberty 
that they perceive to be under existential threat.30 These social 
conditions have created fertile ground for an antiliberal revival. 
For the first time in more than a half century, it is possible to 
imagine the Court clearing a doctrinal path and opening the way 
toward a more robust form of religious—and, more specifically, 
Christian—preferentialism. 
 
 27. There is now a robust literature on the question of whether religion 
warrants special benefits and special burdens under the First Amendment. 
Compare, e.g., EISGRUBER AND SAGER, supra note 15, and LABORDE, supra note 
16, and BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012), and Micah Schwartz-
man, What if Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012), with, e.g., 
KATHLEEN BRADY, THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: RE-
THINKING RELIGION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE (2015), and ANDREW KOPPEL-
MAN, DEFENDING AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013), and Christopher 
C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481 (2017). 
 28. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the 
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 282–83 (2001).  
 29. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 30. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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I.  LIBERALISM AND CHURCH-STATE SEPARATION   
Before discussing religious antiliberalism, we should begin 
by briefly describing what we take to be the core characteristics 
of a liberal account of church and state. This will help us under-
stand the various attacks on liberalism and how those attacks 
implicate legal doctrine.  
Though liberalism is a highly contested concept, we under-
stand it at a minimum to require that the state not concern itself 
with the salvation of its citizens. Following John Locke, the lib-
eral state does not seek to coerce belief.31 Religious belief is the 
domain of individual conscience.32 The liberal state also does not 
treat citizens differently on account of their religious affiliation 
or belief. Citizens are equal before the law regardless of their 
religious practice.33 This means that the state may not favor 
some religious believers over others, especially in the distribu-
tion of public benefits and burdens.34 And finally in a liberal 
state, there is a distinction between secular and religious law. 
The former operates in public and involves state coercion. The 
latter operates in private and, though it might involve private 
pressure, it cannot be enforced by the state. The state may not 
adopt religious law or become an arm of a particular religious 
denomination.35 
 
 31. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 53–56 (James 
H. Tully ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1689); see also Micah Schwartzman, The 
Relevance of Locke’s Religious Arguments for Toleration, 33 POL. THEORY 678, 
690–93 (2005) (discussing Locke’s claim that sincere religious belief cannot be 
coerced). For Locke’s influence on the American tradition of religious freedom, 
see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 89–95 (1986); 
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 346, 373–78 (2002). 
 32. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 205–16 (arguing 
for “equal liberty of conscience” and rejecting “[t]he notion of a confessional 
state”); RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 310–15; see also AMY 
GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 151–91 (2003); MILTON R. KONVITZ, RELI-
GIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE 73–106 (1968); JOCELYN MACLURE & 
CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 62–64 (2011); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 19–25 (2008). 
 33. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 15, at 15; TEBBE, supra note 16, at 72–
73. 
 34. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 212 (“The state can 
favor no particular religion and no penalties or disabilities may be attached to 
any religious affiliation or lack thereof.”). 
 35. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 62; JOHN RAWLS, 
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These basic commitments to the separation of church and 
state are mainly a product of the Enlightenment. The effort to 
separate the state and religion was in part a reaction to the Eu-
ropean wars of religion between Protestants and Catholics.36 
Basic principles of religious toleration, if not full civic equality, 
found early support in some European states, like the Nether-
lands.37 And these principles carried over into the nascent 
United States.38 Although states had established churches well 
into the nineteenth century, the federal government was 
founded without an official church.39 The Constitution did not 
impose any religious test for office or place civil disabilities on 
individuals on account of their faith.40 This national experiment, 
which promised equal status to all religious believers, whatever 
their denomination, was unique to the United States.41  
 
The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 588–94 (Sam-
uel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revis-
ited]; see also ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON  
31–41 (2000); LABORDE, supra note 16, at 117–32; Andrew Koppelman, Secular 
Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 161–65 (2002); Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 
1401–03. 
 36. This history has been told many times. See JOHN MARSHALL, JOHN 
LOCKE, TOLERATION, AND EARLY ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE 15–194 (2006); 
TOLERATION IN ENLIGHTENMENT EUROPE (Ole Peter Grell & Roy Porter eds., 
2000); PEREZ ZAGORIN, HOW THE IDEA OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION CAME TO THE 
WEST (2003). But cf. BEYOND THE PERSECUTING SOCIETY: RELIGIOUS TOLERA-
TION BEFORE THE ENLIGHTENMENT (John Christian Laursen & Cary J. Neder-
man eds., 1998) (detailing the practice of religious toleration in early modern 
Europe).  
 37. See Ernestine van der Wall, Toleration and Enlightenment in the Dutch 
Republic, in TOLERATION IN ENLIGHTENMENT EUROPE, supra note 36, at 114; 
CALVINISM AND RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE (R. Po-
Chia Hsia & Henk van Nierop eds., 2002). 
 38. See generally THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND 
STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986); LEON-
ARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT (2d ed. 1994). 
 39. See 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTAB-
LISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 18–33 (2008) (discussing the history of disestablish-
ment during the Founding era). 
 40. See ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITU-
TION: A MORAL DEFENSE OF THE SECULAR STATE 29–33 (2005) (discussing the 
rejection of religious tests in the federal Constitution). 
 41. Daniel L. Dreisbach, The Constitution’s Forgotten Religion Clause: Re-
flections on the Article VI Religious Test Ban, 38 J. CHURCH & ST. 261, 263 
(1996) (“The U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on religious tests for federal office-
holders was historically unprecedented.”). 
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The intellectual roots of church-state liberalism in the 
United States can be traced to foundational texts like John 
Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689),42 James Madi-
son’s Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assess-
ments (1785),43 and Thomas Jefferson’s A Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom (1779), written for Virginia.44 But liberalism 
is a broader philosophical tradition, with roots in the writings of 
Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, among oth-
ers.45 A liberal theory advances a particular kind of relationship 
between the state and its citizens, one that embraces both popu-
lar sovereignty and limited government and further presumes 
the equal worth of citizens and rejection of the arbitrary exercise 
of power.46 The development of rights-enforcing constitutional 
democracies can be traced to a liberal theory of the state.47  
In the twentieth century, religious toleration served as the 
basis for an expansion of the notion of state neutrality toward a 
broader range of “conceptions of the good”—to use John Rawls’s 
terminology.48 Rawls was a liberal of the late-twentieth century, 
a century that witnessed the rise of state-supported fascism and 
communism, a surge of nationalism, as well as the liberatory ef-
forts of racial, ethnic, and religious minorities around the world. 
Liberalism has been offered as a way to recognize the reasonable 
demands of those within diverse societies when agreement on 
fundamentals is impossible and when disagreement has too of-
ten led to bloodshed. Rawls’s “intuitive idea” was to “generalize 
 
 42. LOCKE, supra note 31.  
 43. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments, in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29, 29 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
 44. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 545, 545 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). 
 45. See supra note 11. 
 46. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181 (1985); Judith N. 
Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy 
L. Rosenblum ed., 1989); Waldron, supra note 11, at 140.  
 47. See ANDREAS KALYVAS & IRA KATZNELSON, LIBERAL BEGINNINGS: 
MAKING A REPUBLIC FOR THE MODERNS (2008); RYAN, supra note 11, at 38–40; 
cf. HELENA ROSENBLATT, THE LOST HISTORY OF LIBERALISM: FROM ANCIENT 
ROME TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2018) (providing a history of the devel-
opment and transformation of liberalism). 
 48. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 75. According to 
Rawls, liberal principles of justice “should be, as far as possible, independent of 
the opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens 
affirm. In formulating such a conception, political liberalism applies the princi-
ple of toleration to philosophy itself.” Id. at 9–10.  
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the principle of religious toleration to a social form, thereby ar-
riving at equal liberty in public institutions.”49  
The aim of political liberalism, following Rawls, is to explain 
how citizens with deeply divergent ethical and religious commit-
ments can nevertheless converge on liberal principles of justice 
for regulating basic political and economic institutions.50 On this 
account, the liberal state does not endorse or enforce a particular 
comprehensive worldview—religious or otherwise—but estab-
lishes a framework within which individuals are generally free 
to pursue their own comprehensive ethical, moral, and religious 
ends.51 The state is required to treat all its citizens with equal 
concern and respect, and it does so, in part, by not advancing its 
own comprehensive religious, philosophical, or ethical agenda.52 
This gives rise to an important public/private distinction. In a 
liberal state, the exercise of political power is legitimate only if 
it can be justified on terms that all citizens can reasonably ac-
cept.53 The requirements of “public reason” mean that a state 
cannot enforce a law if the only justification for the law is based 
on a specific comprehensive doctrine. A standard example of 
such a non-public reason is one that relies for its justificatory 
force on values or modes of reasoning drawn from a particular 
religious tradition.54  
Obviously, this formulation of political liberalism is the bar-
est sketch. In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, 
Rawls has been a lightning rod for liberalism’s critics, so it is 
important to have a sense of his basic claims. But the scholarly 
and jurisprudential debates over the Religion Clauses obviously 
precede Rawls. Rawls himself makes limited appearances in the 
legal literature of church and state and no appearances, as far 
 
 49. LABORDE, supra note 16, at 27. 
 50. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 134 (developing 
and defending “the idea of an overlapping consensus”).  
 51. Id. at 226–27; see also JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PER-
FECTION 41–44 (2011); Charles Larmore, Public Reason, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO RAWLS, supra note 12, at 368, 373–74; Micah Schwartzman, The 
Completeness of Public Reason, 3 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 191 (2004). 
 52. See Schwartzman, supra note 51, at 200. 
 53. Here we are paraphrasing Rawls’s “liberal principle of legitimacy.” See 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 217. For elaboration and de-
fense of this principle, see QUONG, supra note 51, at 131–35.  
 54. Though, as Rawls emphasizes, public reason is also distinguished from 
secular comprehensive ethical and moral doctrines. See RAWLS, The Idea of Pub-
lic Reason Revisited, supra note 35, at 583–84.  
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as we know, in federal court decisions involving matters of reli-
gious freedom.55  
It is also important to observe that, although liberalism and 
its critics join in battle at the moment of the Enlightenment, 
modern debates about the Religion Clauses only take shape in 
the mid-twentieth century, when the Supreme Court applied the 
First Amendment to the states.56 These debates generally pre-
sume the outlines of a non-theocratic, democratic state in which 
citizens are empowered to assert rights against a constitution-
ally limited government. In other words, the general contours of 
the liberal state are well-entrenched, even if imperfectly real-
ized, at the moment when the Court first articulates the modern 
doctrine of church and state.  
Nevertheless, Religion Clause conflicts have forced the 
Court to define the limits of state power to fund or otherwise 
support religion, to teach religious subjects or promulgate reli-
gious principles in schools and other government-run institu-
tions or in public places, to force individuals or groups to engage 
in or refrain from engaging in religious practices, to provide ex-
emptions to religious persons from laws that burden their reli-
gious conscience, or to adjudicate intra-religious disputes in the 
civil courts.57  
The appropriate rule in any of these cases has always impli-
cated foundational principles, even as judges and scholars have 
seemed to share similar background assumptions. One of these 
shared assumptions is what Cécile Laborde calls a requirement 
of “minimal secularism.”58 This idea is that the liberal state can-
not also be a religious state, at least not in the sense of enforcing 
laws that are justified solely on religious grounds. Religious au-
thorities do not exercise civil authority, and vice versa.59 Fur-
thermore, appeals to religious authority—for example, in the 
 
 55. A Westlaw search for citations to Rawls’s work in federal courts turns 
up about a dozen cases, but none of them involve matters of religious freedom.  
 56. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 39, at 33–39; Frederick Mark Gedicks, 
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause Against the States: A Logical, Tex-
tual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669 (2013). 
 57. For surveys of Supreme Court doctrine across these various subjects, 
see 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE 
AND FAIRNESS (2006); 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 39.  
 58. LABORDE, supra note 16, at 116.  
 59. Id. at 143 (“It is because minimal secularism is committed to the sub-
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form of “because scripture says so”—are not a sufficient basis for 
legislation or legal decision making.60 The doctrinal debates over 
the Religion Clauses have tended to operate within the terms of 
these broad principles, even as their application has been con-
tested.  
Of course, there have always been those who understand the 
basic concept of church-state separation as being compatible 
with a robustly Christian state, either by ignoring the First 
Amendment or by assimilating it to the idea of a “Christian na-
tion.”61 The Court has been at the center of battles over school 
prayer, the teaching of evolution, support for religious instruc-
tion, public recognition of majority faiths, and coercive suppres-
sion of minority ones.62 Religion Clause doctrine is contested, 
both within the terms of a seemingly shared liberalism and when 
that liberal project is outright rejected.  
In either case, dissatisfaction with and contestation over the 
requirements of liberalism means that even basic assumptions 
about the appropriate relationship between church and state 
cannot be taken for granted. Liberalism and church-state sepa-
ration are often connected in the minds of both supporters and 
critics. When liberalism is under sustained attack, the existing 
terms of church-state separation are also under sustained at-
tack. 
 
stantive ideals of personal liberty that it rejects the enforcement of comprehen-
sive doctrines, such as religious doctrines, by the state.”); see also Larkin v. 
Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126–27 (1982) (“[T]he core rationale underly-
ing the Establishment Clause is preventing ‘a fusion of governmental and reli-
gious functions[.]’ The Framers did not set up a system of government in which 
important, discretionary governmental powers would be delegated to or shared 
with religious institutions.” (citations omitted)). 
 60. See Koppleman, supra note 35, at 88. 
 61. For critical discussions of the claim that the United States is a “Chris-
tian nation,” see, for example, STEVEN K. GREEN, INVENTING A CHRISTIAN 
AMERICA: THE MYTH OF THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDING (2015); KEVIN M. KRUSE, 
ONE NATION UNDER GOD: HOW CORPORATE AMERICA INVENTED CHRISTIAN 
AMERICA (2015); DAMON LINKER, THE THEOCONS: SECULAR AMERICA UNDER 
SIEGE (2006); Jared A. Goldstein, How the Constitution Became Christian, 68 
HASTINGS L.J. 259 (2017). 
 62. For recent historical treatments of the Court’s involvement in these and 
other controversies over religion freedom, see NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 
(2005); SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW: RELIGIOUS VOICES 
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN MODERN AMERICA (2010); DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH 
OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2011). 
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II.  THE ANTILIBERAL REVIVAL   
Recent expressions of religious antiliberalism are no excep-
tion to this pattern, and they track well their historical prede-
cessors. It is now common to hear the claim that liberalism is in 
crisis, that it has failed, or that it is collapsing into some other 
regime type, usually authoritarianism of a socialist or fascist va-
riety.63  
Antiliberal thought is full of such diagnoses, all of which 
start with the same premises. According to critics, liberalism is 
somehow both pervasive and self-defeating, although a positive 
account of liberalism independent of what it has wrought is dif-
ficult to discern. Instead, there is reference to liberalism as “an 
encompassing political ecosystem in which we have swum, una-
ware of its existence.”64 Liberalism is one of the “three great com-
petitor political ideologies,” along with fascism and communism, 
but it operates silently.65 Professor Patrick Deneen claims that 
“[i]n contrast to its crueler competitor ideologies, liberalism is 
more insidious: as an ideology, it pretends to neutrality, claiming 
no preference and denying any intention of shaping the souls un-
der its rule.”66 Moreover, liberalism infects every aspect of our 
political, social, and personal lives. In all these domains, “liber-
alism has transformed human institutions in the name of ex-
panding liberty and increasing our mastery and control of our 
fates. And in each case . . . the vehicles of our liberation have be-
come iron cages of our captivity.”67  
This type of rhetoric is not new. As Stephen Holmes ob-
serves in his Anatomy of Antiliberalism, “[t]he disparagement of 
liberalism is not a passing fashion of the late twentieth century. 
It is a recurring feature of Western political culture at least since 
the French revolution. . . . [In] the 1920s and 1930s implacable 
hostility to liberalism was the one attitude on which extreme 
rightists and extreme leftists could agree.”68 The vehemence of 
 
 63. See DENEEN, supra note 10; LEGUTKO, supra note 10; Adrian Vermeule, 
All Human Conflict Is Ultimately Theological, CHURCH LIFE J. (July 26, 2019), 
https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/all-human-conflict-is-ultimately 
-theological/ [https://perma.cc/RW5L-DYLA]. 
 64. DENEEN, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
 65. Id. at 5. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id. at 6.  
 68. HOLMES, supra note 7, at xi.  
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those denunciations is continuous with early attacks on the En-
lightenment and in particular with the rejection of received 
moral or religious authority.  
The content of the critique is also similar across time. An-
tiliberal thinkers tend to agree that the current social and polit-
ical rot, whether at the turn of the nineteenth or twentieth cen-
turies, is a function of liberalism’s celebration and emancipation 
of the autonomous or “liberated individual” and, specifically, the 
“disintegration of society into atomized individuals—selfish, cal-
culating, materialistic.”69 The core problem is “the calamity of an 
autonomous, irreligious humanistic consciousness.”70 Such soci-
eties promote “boundless materialism,”71 sexual licentiousness, 
and “a nearly universal pursuit of immediate gratifica-
tion . . . hedonic titillation, visceral crudeness, and distraction, 
all oriented toward promoting consumption, appetite and de-
tachment.”72 The mode of antiliberal thought is similar as well, 
as Holmes has described: decry the existing political and spir-
itual decline of Western society, warn of an impending catastro-
phe, identify the intellectual and historical moment when the 
West lost its way, and suggest how recovering a lost past might 
help pull humanity back from the brink.73 
How has the antiliberal tradition approached the core lib-
eral commitment of separation of church and state? Early writ-
ers in this tradition bemoaned rising secularism and the reduced 
power of the Church, rejected out-of-hand the concept of liberal 
tolerance, and advocated a return to traditional communal and 
hierarchical moral and sexual norms, if not a return to theocratic 
governance.74 Perhaps unsurprisingly, some contemporary an-
tiliberals have embraced similar views; in Hungary and Poland, 
 
 69. Id. at 6. 
 70. Id. (quoting ALEKSANDR SOLZHENITSYN, A WORLD SPLIT APART: COM-
MENCEMENT ADDRESS DELIVERED AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY JUNE 8, 1978, at 57 
(Irina Ilovayskaya Alberti trans., 1978)). 
 71. Id. (quoting SOLZHENITSYN, supra note 70, at 53). 
 72. DENEEN, supra note 10, at 39. 
 73. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 5–7.  
 74. See, e.g., JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, CONSIDERATIONS ON FRANCE (Richard A. 
Lebrun ed., 1994); see also ISAIAH BERLIN, Joseph de Maistre and the Origins of 
Fascism, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 91 (Henry Harding ed., 1991); 
HOLMES, supra note 7, at 13–36. 
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there have been moves toward establishing “illiberal democ-
racy,” defined in terms of conservative Christian nationalism.75  
Some contemporary antiliberal thinkers, however, seek to 
make peace with a religiously pluralistic society, while protect-
ing and extending religious institutional, cultural, and political 
redoubts.76 Others seek to capture political hearts and minds, to 
 
 75. The Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, has defended the idea 
of “Christian democracy” as “illiberal.” He recently summarized his view in 
stark terms: 
Let us confidently declare that Christian democracy is not liberal. Lib-
eral democracy is liberal, while Christian democracy is, by definition, 
not liberal: it is, if you like, illiberal. And we can specifically say this in 
connection with a few important issues – say, three great issues. Lib-
eral democracy is in favour of multiculturalism, while Christian democ-
racy gives priority to Christian culture; this is an illiberal concept. Lib-
eral democracy is pro-immigration, while Christian democracy is anti-
immigration; this is again a genuinely illiberal concept. And liberal de-
mocracy sides with adaptable family models, while Christian democ-
racy rests on the foundations of the Christian family model; once more, 
this is an illiberal concept. 
Viktor Orbán, Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open University and Stu-
dent Camp (July 29, 2018), https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/ 
the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the 
-29th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp [https://perma.cc/ 
Z2WN-CHTW]; see also Zack Beauchamp, It Happened There: How Democracy 
Died in Hungary, VOX (Sept. 13, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy 
-and-politics/2018/9/13/17823488/hungary-democracy-authoritarianism-trump 
[https://perma.cc/2N8J-DFMC]; Aleksandra Wróbel, Orbán Pledges To Keep 
Hungary Safe and Christian, POLITICO (May 7, 2018, 3:06 PM), https://www 
.politico.eu/article/orban-christian-migrants-pledges-to-keep-hungary-safe 
[https://perma.cc/3E8V-NESQ]. 
Poland has also moved significantly in the direction of illiberal democracy 
and Christian nationalism. See Volha Charnysh, The Rise of Poland’s Far Right: 
How Extremism Is Going Mainstream, FOREIGN AFF. (Dec. 18, 2017), https:// 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2017-12-18/rise-polands-far-right 
[https://perma.cc/D96J-38X8]; Will Hutton, Beware the Illiberal Alliance of Po-
land and Hungary, a Grave Threat to the EU, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2018, 7:04 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/07/hungary-poland 
-had-enough-of-liberal-democracy-eu-must-act [https://perma.cc/WY5U 
-YDPG]; Jan-Werner Müller, The Problem with Poland, N.Y. REV. BOOKS: NYR 
DAILY (Feb. 11, 2016, 1:22 PM), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2016/02/11/ 
kaczynski-eu-problem-with-poland/ [https://perma.cc/G8PH-FDEX] (“[B]oth Po-
land and Hungary now offer a toxic ideological brew that is reminiscent of in-
terwar Europe: anti-communism and anti-capitalism can be combined and jus-
tified in the name of a highly intolerant nationalism based on Christian values 
that conclusively define who is a true Hungarian or true Pole.”). 
 76. See infra Part II.C. 
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transform liberal regimes from the inside-out by doing cultural 
battle.77  
Common to all these approaches is a broad skepticism of the 
liberal project. That skepticism takes a variety of forms and gen-
erates a range of alternatives. Here, we identify four broad 
themes—anti-secularism, anti-paganism, organicism, and inte-
gralism—that have recently reemerged in the legal literature. 
The first two—anti-secularism and anti-paganism—are mainly 
presented as diagnoses of liberalism’s failures and the resulting 
culture wars in Western democratic societies. The latter two—
organicism and integralism—are primarily normative proposals; 
they provide strategies for responding to the perceived threats 
and vulnerabilities of liberal regimes. Although some of these 
proposals are radical, skepticism about liberalism does not nec-
essarily entail the abandonment of the basic idea of church-state 
separation or liberty of conscience. But as those two ideas could 
be said to constitute central aspects of liberalism, it is fair to ask 
whether present-day antiliberals lack the courage of their con-
victions—and, if they were to follow those convictions, what 
would be left of religious freedom under the First Amendment.  
A. ANTI-SECULARISM 
Consider first the claim that Western society is approaching 
an “existential crisis for secular liberalism.”78 This apparent cri-
sis is a central trope in the antiliberal canon. Antiliberals argue 
that the concept of the “secular” is incoherent and that, in some 
cases, the secular state is both hostile to religion and amoral. 
The incoherence of the secular is directly connected with its lack 
of moral foundations.79 According to the critical literature, which 
emerges on both the political left and the right, our theory of 
church-state separation, and more specifically, our current Reli-
gion Clause doctrine, rests on a contradiction. Modern religious 
liberty has a religious foundation. Though its basic categories 
 
 77. See infra Part II.D. 
 78. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al., Introduction to AFTER SECULAR LAW 
1, 1 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. eds., 2011).  
 79. See, e.g., 2 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE IMPACT OF 
THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION, at x 
(2003) (“And today it is not evident what new fundamental beliefs have replaced 
orthodox religious beliefs as a foundation on which our legal institutions rest. 
Consequently, our legal discourse, our network of legal values, lacks the power 
and vitality that it once had.”). 
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cannot be acknowledged as religious, the political and legal in-
stantiation of those categories forces a psychological and social 
separatism that is incongruent with how religious people often 
understand their own beliefs and practices.80 
This critique of secularism has two main parts. The first is 
a claim that the bifurcation between secular and religious is it-
self religious, grounded in a certain form of Christianity. The ar-
gument that church-state separation represents a distinctly 
Protestant theological outlook is now commonplace.81 Some an-
tiliberals embrace the religious and specifically Christian roots 
of secularism, but they often bemoan the development of the sec-
ular from its Catholic origins toward a privatized conception af-
ter the Protestant Reformation.82  
The asserted failure of liberalism to understand and make 
explicit its religious foundations is linked to a second objection. 
Critics argue that the liberal state wrongly excludes religious 
reasons as grounds for justifying law-making in a democratic so-
ciety.83 Liberal theories are often condemned for requiring wide-
ranging restrictions on making religious arguments in the public 
sphere, though standard accounts of public reason, including 
 
 80. See WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM 1–12 (2005). 
 81. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DIS-
COURSE 107–50 (2010); Talal Asad, Thinking about Religion, Belief and Politics, 
in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RELIGIOUS STUDIES 36, 43–45 (Robert A. 
Orsi ed., 2012); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Believing in Religious Freedom, in 
POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 45, 46–49 (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan et al. 
eds., 2015); Saba Mahmood, Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommen-
surable Divide?, 35 CRITICAL INQUIRY 836 (2009). But see LABORDE, supra note 
16, at 32–36 (rejecting what she calls the “Protestant critique”).  
 82. See BERMAN, supra note 79, at 193; BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNIN-
TENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 
365–87 (2012). 
 83. There is an extensive literature criticizing this view. See, e.g., CHRISTO-
PHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN LIBERAL POLITICS (2002); KENT 
GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); SMITH, 
supra note 81; Michael W. McConnell, Secular Reason and the Misguided At-
tempt To Exclude Religious Argument from Democratic Deliberation, 1 J.L. 
PHIL. & CULTURE 159 (2007); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Why We Should Reject 
What Liberalism Tells Us About Speaking and Acting in Public for Religious 
Reasons, in RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 162 (Paul Weithman 
ed., 1997); cf. Jonathan Quong, Public Reason, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 
24, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/public-reason/ 
[https://perma.cc/46MU-G6S7] (surveying literature on objections to public rea-
son, including the exclusion of appeals to religious convictions). 
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Rawls’s, are more nuanced and permissive than many have rec-
ognized.84 Such accounts are concerned not only about religious 
reasons, but also reasons drawn from secular comprehensive 
doctrines, as the state ought to be neutral, so far as possible, 
among competing conceptions of the good.85 Accordingly, citizens 
can rightly demand that exercises of political power be justified 
on the basis of public reasons, which can be shared by those with 
differing conceptions of the good.86 
The exclusion of religious reasons has long been a source of 
antiliberal discontent. Richard John Neuhaus’s The Naked Pub-
lic Square made this concern widely known in the 1980s.87 His 
complaint, that modern church-state doctrine’s restriction of re-
ligious voices in public evinces hostility to religion, has become a 
common criticism among religious conservatives.88 Left-leaning 
theorists also criticize the bifurcation of the political world into 
public/private, asserting that state power undergirds all suppos-
edly “private” acts. The religious/secular binary is both con-
structed and oppressive, insofar as it marginalizes religious 
modes of political life.89  
 
 84. See Micah Schwartzman, The Sincerity of Public Reason, 19 J. POL. 
PHIL. 375, 394 (2011) (“[T]he wide view of public reason does not prevent citi-
zens and officials from presenting their ethical and religious arguments in pub-
lic deliberation. Nothing in the principle of sincere public justification precludes 
supplementing public reasons with arguments based on nonpublic values.”). 
 85. See RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, supra note 35, at 583–
84, 587–88 (comparing religious and “secular reason,” and arguing that both are 
outside the domain of public reason). 
 86. See id. For some recent defenses of this view, see ANDREW LISTER, PUB-
LIC REASON AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY (2013); LORI WATSON & CHRISTIE 
HARTLEY, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND PUBLIC REASON: A FEMINIST POLITICAL LIB-
ERALISM (2018); Jonathan Quong, On the Idea of Public Reason, in A COMPAN-
ION TO RAWLS, supra note 12, at 265.  
 87. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1984).  
 88. See, e.g., HUGH HECLO, CHRISTIANITY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY  
128–32 (2007); SMITH, supra note 10, at 334–43; Michael W. McConnell, Five 
Reasons To Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from 
Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639 (1999); Matthew J. Franck, 
The Unreasonableness of Secular Public Reason, PUB. DISCOURSE (Aug. 28, 
2015), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2015/08/14619/ [https://perma.cc/ 
GJ9W-LD6U].  
 89. Consider Craig Calhoun’s claim that the “use of the public/private dis-
tinction to enforce a kind of secularism is embarrassingly reminiscent of the use 
of the same distinction to minimize . . . women’s political participation.” Craig 
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But the real concern is the disqualification of religious rea-
sons for law-making. Religious antiliberalism is deeply suspi-
cious of any effort to distinguish between religious and secular 
reasons, policies, or forms of government—indeed, to define “re-
ligion” or “religious” in contradistinction to something else called 
“secular” at all. The inability to settle on a definition—one that 
does not import substantive judgments about what constitutes 
reasonable and rational argument and what does not—leads to 
claims about the “impossibility of religious freedom.”90 
The deconstruction of the religious/secular divide also leads 
to difficulties in defining other terms, like “theocracy.” To the 
extent that the liberal state is, by definition, non-theocratic, the 
crisis of liberalism opens the door to explicitly theocratic re-
gimes. Of course, if secularism is itself a religion or a theological 
concept, then we already live in a theocratic regime. Contempo-
rary antiliberals on both the left and the right have invoked Carl 
Schmitt’s famous claim that “[a]ll significant concepts of the 
modern theory of the state are secularized theological con-
cepts.”91 Schmittian “political theology” posits a world in which 
secularization is the transfer of authority from an omnipotent 
God to an omnipotent ruler, in which the modern concept of sov-
ereignty is a secularized version of the theological idea of divine 
authority.92 
This notion of the liberal state as displaced theology is a con-
sistent antiliberal trope, shared by antistatist critics on the left 
who are attracted to the disintegration of the concept of the sec-
ular.93 These critics are more concerned about the state’s juridi-
cal power to define religion to the exclusion of minority believers 
 
Calhoun, Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, in RETHINKING SEC-
ULARISM 77 (Craig Calhoun et al. eds., 2011). 
 90. SULLIVAN, supra note 80, at 1.  
 91. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CON-
CEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 36 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2005) 
(1922). 
 92. See HOLMES, supra note 7, at 46–47; John P. McCormick, Review: Po-
litical Theory and Political Theology: The Second Wave of Carl Schmitt in Eng-
lish, 26 POL. THEORY 830 (1998).  
 93. See Banu Bargu, Stasiology: Political Theology and the Figure of the 
Sacrificial Enemy, in AFTER SECULAR LAW, supra note 78, at 140, 140–55; Craig 
Calhoun et al., Introduction to RETHINKING SECULARISM, supra note 89, at 3, 5; 
Sullivan et al., supra note 78, at 1–12. 
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than they are about the liberal state’s inability to rule.94 On their 
view, the secular state is quite powerful already, though it is also 
vulnerable to religious schism and ethnic violence.95 The secular 
state appears unable to comprehend or address the rising religi-
osity in its midst. And so, paradoxically, secularism is also quite 
fragile, so much so that perhaps the whole project should be 
abandoned.96  
B. ANTI-PAGANISM 
In recent years, especially among religious conservatives, 
the antiliberal critique of secularism has taken a more distinc-
tive form.97 As we have seen, the critique is that liberalism is the 
product of a particular religious view,98 and, as such, it promotes 
an ethical and moral perspective that can be characterized as 
religious. But if liberalism is a religion, which religion is it?  
According to some antiliberal critics, the answer is that lib-
eralism is a form of paganism. Consider Milton Himmelfarb’s as-
sertion, made in the early 1990s, that “[t]he trouble is not that 
religion in general has too small a role in American public life. 
The trouble is that a particular religion has too great a role—
paganism, the de facto established religion.”99 The target here 
was and is liberalism: 
The Enlightenment’s project was liberal—to liberate us for the pursuit 
of our happiness. But much of what began as liberal has turned liber-
tine, and libertinism has brought not liberation and happiness so much 
as enslavement and misery: AIDS, kids who have kids, the absent fa-
ther. First the French Revolution devoured its children, then the Bol-
shevik Revolution, and now the sexual revolution.100 
A more recent and refined version of this argument can be 
found in Professor Steven Smith’s recent book, Pagans and 
 
 94. Cf. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 33–35 (1983).  
 95. See Mark Juergensmeyer, Rethinking the Secular and Religious Aspects 
of Violence, in RETHINKING SECULARISM, supra note 89, at 185, 196–99. 
 96. See Sullivan et al., supra note 78, at 16. 
 97. This Part draws on material from Richard Schragger & Micah 
Schwartzman, Jews, Not Pagans, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 497 (2019). 
 98. See, e.g., Sullivan et al., supra note 79, at 8. But see LABORDE, supra 
note 16, at 6, 32–36 (rejecting Sullivan’s critique that liberalism is a form of 
Protestantism).  
 99. Milton Himmelfarb, in AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATIONIST FAITH 
65, 65 (David G. Dalin ed., 1992). 
 100. Id. at 66. 
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Christians in the City.101 Smith joins other antiliberals in de-
scribing Western cultural conflict as a battle between Christian-
ity and the “modern paganism” of secular liberals.102 “Christian,” 
for Smith, is a term for all those who believe in a transcendent 
God, including orthodox religious believers across faith tradi-
tions.103 Pagans, by contrast, reject transcendent religion in fa-
vor of non-natural but immanent conceptions of the good.104 Cul-
turally, pagans are the vast majority of secularized Westerners, 
who are assimilated to the dominant culture: liberalism.105  
Smith’s diagnosis of the culture conflict is not entirely new. 
Indeed, Smith frames his project as an effort to revive and de-
fend T.S. Eliot’s thesis that Western societies are marked by ex-
istential conflict between Christianity and paganism.106 Writing 
in the 1930s, Eliot argued that Christianity in the West was un-
der attack by “Liberalism,” which elevated the values of individ-
uality and originality over the traditional morality of the 
Church.107 In The Idea of a Christian Society, he called for the 
Christianization of England, which he feared was slouching to-
ward paganism.108 Eliot’s Christian establishment was intended 
to reflect, support, and direct a Christian society. The alternative 
was to “merely sink into an apathetic decline” or become a  
“totalitarian democracy.”109 To those “who are . . . repelled 
by . . . such a prospect,” Eliot responded, “one can assert that the 
only possibility of control and balance is a religious control and 
 
 101. SMITH, supra note 10; see also Robert P. George, Foreword to id., at  
ix–xiv (adopting Smith’s claim that liberals and progressives are “neopagans”); 
John Waters, Defending the Religious Sense, FIRST THINGS (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/11/defending-the-religious 
-sense [https://perma.cc/F4FR-7MDJ] (same). 
 102. See SMITH, supra note 10. 
 103. See id. at 216, 223, 303.  
 104. Id. at 210–12; cf. Charles Taylor, Western Secularity, in RETHINKING 
SECULARISM, supra note 89, at 31, 33 (claiming that “a broader distinction, that 
which divided ‘this world,’ or the immanent, from the transcendent . . . has be-
come part of our way of seeing things in the West”). 
 105. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 246–48. 
 106. Id. at 8–11, 378–79; see also R.R. RENO, RESURRECTING THE IDEA OF A 
CHRISTIAN SOCIETY (2016). 
 107. T.S. ELIOT, AFTER STRANGE GODS: A PRIMER OF MODERN HERESY  
22–23, 48 (1934).  
 108. T.S. ELIOT, CHRISTIANITY & CULTURE: THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCI-
ETY AND NOTES TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE 16, 20–35 (1949).  
 109. Id. at 18. 
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balance; that the only hopeful course for a society which would 
thrive and continue its creative activity in the arts of civilisation, 
is to become Christian.”110 
Eliot, in turn, was reiterating a set of claims already made 
popular by earlier antiliberal thinkers. The attack on liberal-
ism—or on variations such as “secular humanism”—has been re-
markably consistent. Notably, much of that attack, at least in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had a sinister ele-
ment. It was explicitly anti-Semitic. That anti-Semitism appears 
in Eliot’s poetry,111 but it is also integral to his vision of the 
Christian Society.112 In a series of lectures collected under the 
title After Strange Gods, he asserted that cultural homogeneity 
was an essential precondition for such a society.113 Eliot wrote 
that “[w]hat is still more important is unity of religious back-
ground; and reasons of race and religion combine to make any 
large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable.”114 
The link between “free-thinking Jews” and liberalism is not 
coincidental.115 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
liberalism meant the rejection of the religious state, recognition 
of rights of conscience, and, in Europe most consequentially, the 
political emancipation of the Jews.116 That is why the history of 
antiliberal thought is suffused with concern with the “Jewish 
question.”117 For certain critics of liberalism, the problem of the 
Jews of Europe was that they refused to recognize Christianity 
and therefore also the Christian foundations of society and the 
state. There was no way to bring Jews into the fold. As Isaiah 
Berlin observed in describing this line of thinking: “To tolerate 
 
 110. Id. at 18–19.  
 111. See ANTHONY JULIUS, T. S. ELIOT, ANTI-SEMITISM, AND LITERARY FORM 
(2d ed. 2003); CHRISTOPHER B. RICKS, T. S. ELIOT AND PREJUDICE 50 (1988); 
Walter A. Strauss, The Merchant of Venom? T. S. Eliot and Anti-Semitism, 14 
S. CENT. REV. 31 (1997); Louis Menand, Eliot and the Jews, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 
(June 6, 1996), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1996/06/06/eliot-and-the 
-jews/ [https://perma.cc/KG4E-R3LW] (reviewing JULIUS, supra). 
 112. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 97. 
 113. ELIOT, supra note 107. 
 114. Id. at 20.  
 115. See JULIUS, supra note 111, at 157–65.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Cf. Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 
26 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978). 
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[the Jews] as an organized religion is a concession to that liber-
alism and rationalism that constitutes a denial of what men are 
for, to serve the true God.”118  
Other antiliberal writers in the nineteenth and early-twen-
tieth centuries made the relationship between Jews and liberal-
ism more explicit. Consider such assertions that “liberalism is 
nothing but secularized Judaism,”119 or that “[e]very Jew is a lib-
eral. He is a liberal by nature.”120 To the Christian traditionalist, 
the modern Jew posed a “double challenge, both to the primary 
need of culture for religion, and to the subsidiary need for unity 
of religious background.”121 That is because modern Jews are 
“agents both of secularism and heterodoxy.”122 Abraham Kuyper, 
who was prime minister of the Netherlands at the turn of the 
century and a neo-Calvinist theologian, decried the Jews for 
spreading the “Jewish spirit” of liberalism and modernism 
among non-Jews.123 More importantly, the Jew (and the liberal) 
 
 118. JULIUS, supra note 111, at 159 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, THE MAGUS OF 
THE NORTH 52 (1993)).  
 119. Id. at 158 (quoting HUGO VALENTINE, ANTISEMITISM HISTORICALLY 
AND CRITICALLY EXAMINED 62 (1971)). 
 120. Id. at 158 (quoting ERNST NOLTE, THREE FACES OF FASCISM 70 (1969)).  
 121. Id. at 165. 
 122. Id. (“Jews appear to contribute to a culture without sharing that cul-
ture’s religion; they also have their own culture without benefit of adherence to 
Judaism. Free-thinking, they are attached neither to the religion of their birth 
nor to any other religion.”). 
 123. See Ivo Schöffer, Abraham Kuyper and the Jews, in DUTCH JEWISH HIS-
TORY 237, 248–50 (Jozeph Michman & Tirtsah Levie eds., 1984) (describing 
Kuyper’s attitude toward Jews and his warnings against a spreading “Jewish-
ness”). Abraham Kuyper’s anti-Semitic tract, Liberalisten en Joden, apparently 
has not been translated into English. This may explain why some American 
scholars have overlooked his overt religious bigotry. See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., 
The Biography and Biology of Liberty: Abraham Kuyper and the American Ex-
periment, in RELIGION, PLURALISM, AND PUBLIC LIFE: ABRAHAM KUYPER’S LEG-
ACY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 243–62 (Luis E. Lugo ed., 2000). Strangely, Witte 
cites Liberalisten en Joden for the proposition that Kuyper “insisted on the in-
clusion of Jews within the ambit of religious liberty.” Id. at 246 n.10. But there 
is no mention that from the opening paragraphs of his essay, Kuyper claimed 
that “[g]radually one comes to realize that under the cloak of Liberalism the 
Jews have become the lord and master of our continent, and not only control 
public opinion within most countries, but also the international relations be-
tween [them].” A. KUYPER, LIBERALISTEN EN JODEN 5 (1878) (unpublished par-
tial translation by Professor Mila Versteeg, Martha Lubin Karsh & Bruce A. 
Karsh Bicentennial Professor of Law, University of Va.) (on file with authors). 
It is remarkable that Kuyper’s anti-Semitism has been so long ignored by com-
mentators and scholars in the United States.  
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posed a challenge to state power—as freedom of conscience 
served as a limitation on the state—a “liberal erosion of political 
authority for the sake of personal freedom.”124 For Carl Schmitt, 
the preeminent antiliberal statist of Nazi Germany, “Jewish lib-
eralism” was the disease infecting German culture.125  
Of course, Steven Smith and other current antiliberal think-
ers who embrace the Christian/pagan conflict do not trade in 
anti-Semitic tropes. But the place of religious minorities—
whether Jewish, Muslim, Christian or otherwise—causes seri-
ous problems for a revived antiliberal theory that posits only two 
cultural options: Christianity or paganism, even if the former is 
understood ecumenically.126 Smith’s Christian society embraces 
transcendent meaning and rejects liberal assimilation and its 
cultural manifestation, secular humanism.127 Some conservative 
or traditional religious minorities might also find that a “Chris-
tian” society better conforms to their cultural and moral views, 
but there is little, if any, recognition that many religious minor-
ities reject such views without thereby becoming “pagans.”128 
Eliot had less trouble identifying liberal religious minori-
ties. He saw them as a threat, and partly for that reason, he re-
jected religious disestablishment.129 He also appeared to reject 
toleration. Cultural homogeneity was a central precondition for 
the Christian society. Smith and other current-day antiliberals, 
by contrast, do not generally endorse a Christian state, even if 
that seems like a natural extension of their arguments.130 After 
 
 124. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 53. 
 125. Id. at 50–51. Schmitt blamed liberalism for the weakness of the German 
state between the wars: “Perfidious Jewish writers smuggled liberal constitu-
tional principles into Wilhelminian Germany.” Id. at 38. As Holmes notes, “cul-
tural antisemitism was integral to [Schmitt’s] thinking.” Id. at 50. Those liberal 
principles—separation of powers, competitive elections, political parties, and 
the free press—were anathema to Schmitt, who believed that liberal regimes 
were “fainthearted” and “nonconfrontationalist,” id. at 45, and unable to protect 
themselves when attacked. Schmitt’s authoritarianism is a rejection of “weak” 
(read: Jewish) liberalism. See id. at 44–45.  
 126. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 97, at 499–504 (criticizing 
the “message that [Jews] can be either Christian or pagans”). 
 127. SMITH, supra note 10, at 378–79. 
 128. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 97, at 505 (arguing that 
Smith’s theory postulates “[t]he Good Jews . . . are resisters of paganism” while 
“the Bad Jews” are “the assimilated, secularized, and paganized Jews”).  
 129. ELIOT, supra note 108, at 20–24. 
 130. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 377–79. But see infra Part II.B; cf. Ver-
meule, supra note 24 (arguing the Church should enter into “flexible alliances 
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all, why not favor a Christian state if it supports the moral and 
spiritual goods that are so valuable to meaningful human exist-
ence? Why not reject the various forms of paganism, including 
liberal Protestant or enlightenment beliefs that slouch toward 
paganism, that undermine those goods? And why not enlist the 
state’s power to spread belief in the source of transcendent 
meaning, namely, Christianity?  
Smith and other modern antiliberals do not readily provide 
an answer. But the options are limited. If the dangers and dep-
redations of pagan society are so severe, one can either exit or 
resist. Some antiliberal thinkers have advocated the former in 
the face of a culturally foreign modernity.131 Smith advocates the 
latter, at least implicitly, by throwing in his lot with Eliot. But 
he provides little, if any, conceptual space for co-existence. Ulti-
mately, one has to choose between one form of religious practice 
and another—Christianity or paganism. Since it is religion all-
the-way down, the state cannot be neutral. It has to choose. 
C. ORGANICISM 
How to accommodate modern religious pluralism while re-
jecting liberalism presents a problem. In another line of contem-
porary antiliberal thought, the solution seems to be some form 
of “separate spheres,” or divided sovereignty: church on one side, 
state on the other. Smith invokes ancient Rome and the conflict 
between early Christians and pagans as the usable historical 
past that can help explain contemporary church-state doc-
trine.132 But he and other theorists have also recently invoked 
the medieval conflicts over church power as the appropriate 
guide for modern church-state relations.133 It is notable that in 
 
of convenience” as a part of a long-term strategy to establish a confessional 
state). 
 131. See, e.g., ROD DREHER, THE BENEDICT OPTION: A STRATEGY FOR CHRIS-
TIANS IN A POST-CHRISTIAN NATION 80 (2017) (questioning where the “erst-
while” Christians fit in “the politics of post-Christian America” and answering 
“[w]e don’t”).  
 132. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 130–92. 
 133. See Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Conception of Church Auton-
omy, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 20–37 (Micah Schwartz-
man et al. eds., 2016); Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (To-
wards) an Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
33, 52–57 (2013); Paul Horwitz, Defending (Religious) Institutionalism, 99 VA. 
L. REV. 1049, 1052 (2013); Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Liberty of the 
Church: Source, Scope, and Scandal, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 187–
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both instances, the historical moment that seems most relevant 
to the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses—the Enlighten-
ment—is elided. Modernity appears to provide no resource for 
the weary church-state theorist.134 
The recourse to the medieval is in part a function of dissat-
isfaction with liberalism’s individualism. Liberalism and indi-
vidualism are conflated in the minds of many antiliberals, who 
challenge liberal thought on the ground that it underappreciates 
the role of community, church, family, group, and association in 
constituting, guiding, and constraining human agency. Liberal-
ism is faulted for its problematic celebration and reification of 
the freely-choosing, autonomous, “unencumbered” self, a con-
struct that does not comport with the experience of those who 
exist within particular cultural traditions, histories, and con-
texts.135  
An attractive alternative for some church-state scholars is 
the idea of an organic social order, in which churches and other 
collective bodies constitute pre-legal, natural features of the so-
cial landscape.136 This view arises out of medieval theological 
concepts, in particular a commitment to the unified personality 
 
89 (2013). See generally THE CONSCIENCE OF THE INSTITUTION (Helen Alvare 
ed., 2014) (collecting essays discussing perceived threats to religious institu-
tions and advocating greater protection and autonomy for them). 
 134. We have criticized the selective use of (medieval) history to justify con-
temporary claims of “freedom of the church.” See Richard Schragger & Micah 
Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917, 932–39 
(2013) [hereinafter Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutional-
ism]; Richard C. Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in Translation: A Di-
lemma for Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15, 16 (2013) 
[hereinafter Schragger & Schwartzman, Lost in Translation]; see also Frederick 
Mark Gedicks, True Lies: Canossa as Myth, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 133, 
135 (2013); Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and Authority of the 
State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 146 (2013).  
 135. These criticisms are familiar from the communitarian critiques of lib-
eralism that were prominent in the 1980s and 1990s. See generally STEPHEN 
MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS (1996); COMMUNI-
TARIANISM AND INDIVIDUALISM (Shlomi Avineri & Avner de-Shalit eds., 1992) 
(especially essays by Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre, and 
Michael Walzer). 
 136. See generally WALTER ULLMANN, THE GROWTH OF THE PAPAL GOVERN-
MENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES: A STUDY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL RELATION OF CLERI-
CAL TO LAY POWER 358–81 (3d ed. 1970) (discussing “jurisitic theology” based 
on “medieval canon law . . . as a universal law . . . to which . . . all other legal 
systems became subsidiary”). 
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of the Church. Influenced heavily by Otto von Gierke’s interpre-
tation and adaptation of medieval political theory,137 which em-
phasized the personality of corporate bodies, and taken up later 
by the early-twentieth century British Pluralists,138 the idea of 
an organic order is deployed to give heft to the church’s claim for 
independence from the state.139 Consider John Neville Figgis, as-
serting in 1913, in Churches and the Modern State:  
Now the State did not create the family, nor did it create the Churches; 
nor even in any real sense can it be said to have created the club or the 
trades union; nor in the Middle Ages the guild or the religious order, 
hardly even the universities . . . they have all arisen out of the natural 
associative instincts of mankind, and should all be treated . . . as hav-
ing a life original and guaranteed, to be controlled and directed like 
persons . . . .140 
The embrace of “natural” and organic sovereign institutions 
as checks on the impersonal state seems to evoke Ferdinand 
Tönnies’s distinction between community and society, Ge-
meinshaft and Gesellshaft.141 Implicit in this argument is the no-
tion that the church, along with the family, the guild, the com-
mune, and the university, gains its authority by acting as a 
counter-weight to the ever-expanding regulatory state. These 
forms of association are personal and communal; members are 
 
 137. See OTTO GIERKE, ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW: THE CLASSICAL AND EARLY 
CHRISTIAN STAGES (George Heiman ed. & trans., 1977); OTTO GIERKE, POLITI-
CAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE (Frederic William Maitland trans., 1900). 
 138. See CÉCILE LABORDE, PLURALIST THOUGHT AND THE STATE IN BRITAIN 
AND FRANCE, 1900–25, at 13 (2000) (“Real group persons had to be both unified 
and vital, like a true organism, and true organicism was only to be found in the 
political thought of the middle ages.”); DAVID RUNCIMAN, PLURALISM AND THE 
PERSONALITY OF THE STATE 46 (2005) (defining the “organic” account of associ-
ations as views that held association to “emerge[ ]  naturally out of social life” 
and as unable to be “reduced to individual components”). 
 139. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Some Realism About 
Corporate Rights, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 
133, at 349–50, 358 (“The claim that associations are pre-legal, natural features 
of the social landscape is indebted to medieval theological concepts, especially 
the unified personality of the church.”). 
 140. JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 47 (2d ed. 
1914). 
 141. See FERDINAND TÖNNIES, COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY 22, 52 (Jose 
Harris ed., Jose Harris & Margaret Hollis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001) 
(1887) (defining “Gemeinshaft” as human wills that are related to each other by 
descent and kinship, or become so out of necessity, and “Gesellschaft” as a group 
of people who live peacefully alongside one another but without being essen-
tially united). 
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bound by affective ties and self-regulated by common mores. In 
these communities, individual members are more oriented to the 
collective than to their own self-interest.142 The state, by con-
trast, is characterized by the proliferation of formal, rational, im-
personal ties and organizations.143 Moreover, it is destructive of 
local associational life, thus necessitating limits on its author-
ity.144 The conflict between Gemeinshaft and Gesellshaft is an 
abiding concern of those who worry about the rationalization and 
materialism of the modern world. A central theme in antiliberal 
literature (and its cousin, romanticism) is the alienation of mod-
ern individuals—from nature, from community, and from them-
selves.145 
How do these concepts find their way into the modern law 
and theory of church and state? The concept of the organic 
church responds to two concerns about the nature of liberal 
rights. The first is that liberalism erases the distinction between 
religious bodies and other forms of association by treating all or-
ganizations as if they are voluntary associations or clubs.146 If 
 
142. Cf. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 149 (2000) (“The 
church is usually viewed as a kind of unified whole, different from the sum of 
its parts. The glue that holds it together is not contractual . . . . The church is 
thought to be something real with a good of its own, not a procedural device for 
advancing members’ interests.”). 
 143. Cf. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITAL-
ISM 181–82 (Talcott Parsons trans., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1958) (1905) (dis-
cussing the development of the rational, mechanical relationships of a capital-
istic society). 
 144. Cf. Cover, supra note 94, at 32–34 (discussing the impact of “[t]he 
state’s explicit or implicit acknowledgment of a limited sphere of autonomy” on 
the associational autonomy of groups with established normative value systems 
external to the state). 
 145. See, e.g., CHARLES J. CHAPUT, STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND: LIVING 
THE CATHOLIC FAITH IN A POST-CHRISTIAN WORLD 4–5 (2017) (“To protect the 
sovereignty of individuals, democracy separates them from one another. And to 
achieve that, the state sooner or later seeks to break down any relationship or 
entity that stands in its way.”); DENEEN, supra note 10, at 60 (discussing the 
substitution of the state for “traditional human communities and institutions”); 
see also HOLMES, supra note 7, at 231 (“Antiliberals ordinarily vilify rights as 
atomizing and alienating.”); cf. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: 
ROMANTICISM AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL THOUGHT 63 (1987) (dis-
cussing liberalism’s collapse of the public and private spheres and how that con-
tributes to the alienation of the individual). 
 146. See Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches 
(Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMMENT. 515 (2007) (discussing 
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that is so, then it is difficult to justify the special, unique, and 
protected status of churches and religious believers. The second 
and related concern is that liberalism demands that the state 
protect individuals from being coerced by non-state groups or in-
stitutions.147 This demand can be threatening to the institu-
tional authority of the church. When critics raise alarm about 
the overweening state and assert that the government’s regula-
tory power needs to be constrained, they are most centrally wor-
ried about the state’s interference in religious bodies.148  
If churches are natural, pre-legal, and pre-political bodies, 
they have a special claim to govern in their sphere. Separate 
spheres theory generates a space for churches, treats them as 
unique as compared to nonreligious groups, and offers an ac-
count of church-state separation that emphasizes institutional 
autonomy, not individual conscience.149  
An example of a sovereignty-based conception of church-
state relations is the Catholic concept of libertas ecclesiae, or 
“freedom of the church,” which has become newly popular among 
a group of conservative church-state scholars.150 Freedom of the 
church made its appearance during the Investiture controversy 
at the end of the eleventh century, when Pope Gregory VII 
sought to revoke the authority of temporal rulers to select and 
govern clergy in their territories.151 The result was the Wars of 
Investiture, a fifty-year conflict over the relative powers of 
church and crown.152 
 
whether “religious associations” are different from associations such as the Boy 
Scouts “so far as the constitution is concerned”). 
 147. See Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, su-
pra note 134, at 957–62 (arguing that voluntarism is a necessary condition for 
church autonomy).  
 148. See sources cited supra note 133. 
 149. See Schragger & Schwartzman, Lost in Translation, supra note 134, at 
16 (arguing that theories of “freedom of the church” are committed to “three 
theses—involving the sovereignty, specialness, and singularity of religious insti-
tutions”).  
 150. See, e.g., Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, supra note 133, at 61 
(“[T]he libertas ecclesiae principle could be helpful, if not essential, to an under-
standing of . . . the religious freedom protected by the First Amendment of our 
Constitution.”); Smith, supra note 133, at 19–37 (arguing “the jurisdictional 
conception of church autonomy . . . is consistent with the constitutional scheme 
and supportable on a contemporary . . . approach to governmental authority”).  
 151. BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE 1050–1300, at 45 
(1988). 
 152. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF 
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 Some have declared freedom of the church to be the true 
origin of church-state separation in the West, arguing that the 
current doctrinal and theoretical focus on individual rights of 
conscience should be replaced with a new emphasis on institu-
tional power and authority.153 On this anti-rights account, the 
church is analogized to a foreign sovereign, and the question is 
how to divide power between church and state. The church is not 
merely a voluntary association; instead it possesses and exer-
cises jurisdictional sovereignty.154 
Of course, the sovereign church is an anachronism outside 
the Middle Ages, in a time when there is not just one church but 
many.155 Pluralism causes difficulties for a sovereignty-based ac-
count. While the one true church may have had a special status 
in medieval society, it cannot be said to maintain that status to-
day.156 Indeed, the medieval notion of church freedom has little 
to do with freedom of conscience, which did not exist as a concept 
until much later.157 That innovation, which followed the 
Protestant Reformation and the development of “rights of man” 
thereafter, serves as the basis for the modern commitment to 
disestablishment and free exercise.158  
 
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 87 (1983) (“Civil war between the papal and 
imperial parties raged sporadically throughout Europe until 1122 . . . .”); TIER-
NEY, supra note 151, at 45–73 (discussing the various conflicts of Pope Gregory 
VII’s reign, specifically with King Henry IV of Germany). See generally R.W. 
SOUTHERN, WESTERN SOCIETY AND THE CHURCH IN THE MIDDLE AGES 100–04 
(1970) (situating Pope Gregory VII within papal history); ULLMANN, supra note 
136, at 148–72 (listing and expanding on the conflicts of the Gregorian papacy 
of the eleventh century). 
 153. See Smith, supra note 23, at 250 (“The Constitution could be under-
stood—and would be improved by being understood—as mandating distinctive 
treatment not of religion, but of the church.”). 
 154. Id. at 268–69 (analogizing the Church to a foreign embassy with “am-
bassadors of the kingdom of God within the secular domain”).  
 155. See Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, su-
pra note 134, at 933–37 (elaborating this charge of anachronism). 
 156. Id. at 936.  
 157. See Anna Su, Catholic Constitutionalism from the Americanist Contro-
versy to Dignitatis Humanae, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1445, 1446–47 (2016) 
(noting the development of “freedom of conscience” during the twentieth century 
as part of John Courtney Murray S.J.’s writings).  
 158. On this point, proponents of “freedom of the church” may agree, even if 
they lament this development. See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The 
Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1876–78 (2009) (“[T]he 
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Corporatism or separate spheres, which can be understood 
as a kind of communitarianism or “soft” antiliberalism,159 cannot 
readily generate the individual rights necessary to protect reli-
gious dissenters, even if it might protect their communities.160 
The emphasis on organic groups and the importance of mediat-
ing institutions is a form of anti-statism, or perhaps a gesture 
toward legal pluralism. But if such groups exercise real coercive 
or sovereign power, beyond what is contemplated by conven-
tional rights of association, then what makes them different 
from the overweening state? The original freedom of the church 
meant the papal exercise of state authority. In the feudal system 
of eleventh century Europe, bishops were not only spiritual lead-
ers but also royal officials, exercising vast coercive power.161 A 
proliferation of sovereigns, exercising coercive power within 
their spheres, seems only to multiply the potential restrictions 
on individual liberty. 
Some antiliberals advocate recourse to communal settings—
counter-cultural, intentional communities—presumably more 
organic and authentic ways of living with one another.162 But 
why these communities would not be as, or more, oppressive 
 
Protestant Reformation altered the significance of conscience in a way that pro-
foundly affected, and to some extent redirected, historical commitments to the 
separation of church and state.”). 
 159. Cf. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 88 (distinguishing between “soft antiliber-
als,” who, “when faced with practical choices, reveal a surprising fondness for 
liberal protections,” and “hard antiliberals,” who “dare to draw . . . shocking po-
litical consequences,” including “conformist bigotry”).  
 160. See B. Jessie Hill, Change, Dissent, and the Problem of Consent in Reli-
gious Organizations, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra 
note 133, at 419–40 (“If the church is exempted from the requirement of com-
plying with federal civil rights laws, then its members—or some of them—are 
left unprotected.”); Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutional-
ism, supra note 134, at 948–49, 960–62 (discussing the “competing individual 
rights” of members of the church and nonmembers). 
 161. See generally WALTER ULLMANN, THE GROWTH OF THE PAPAL GOVERN-
MENT IN THE MIDDLE AGES: A STUDY IN THE IDEOLOGICAL RELATION OF CLERI-
CAL TO LAY POWER 7–8, 132–33, 139, 281 (3d ed. 1970) (discussing the role and 
power of bishops in papal government and drawing analogies between clerical 
positions and state positions, i.e. “the archbishops correspond to the kings”). 
 162. See DENEEN, supra note 10, at 192–97 (advocating for counter-cultural 
communities that “must be born out of voluntarist intentions, plans, and ac-
tions”); DREHER, supra note 131, at 122–44 (discussing tactics to promote the 
idea of a “Christian village” to raise children, inspired by the proverb: “It takes 
a village to raise a child”).  
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than the liberal state is unclear. Separate spheres, church sov-
ereignty, or intentional communities—these may replace one op-
pressor with another.163  
D. INTEGRALISM  
One could instead reject the religiously pluralistic state al-
together. For a small but vocal number, the antiliberal lessons 
that Eliot and others teach should be taken to heart. Liberalism 
has failed; the religiously pluralistic society is impossible, and 
its replacement should be an explicitly Christian—and, more 
specifically, Roman Catholic—nation.164 
This version of antiliberalism is known as Catholic integral-
ism, which arose in the nineteenth century as an explicit reac-
tion to modernism. A founding text is Pope Pius IX’s 1864 Sylla-
bus of Errors,165 which “rejected everything from rationalism 
and liberalism, to the principles of Church-state separation and 
religious freedom.”166 A revived integralism is an outlier in Cath-
 
 163. This, again, is a familiar criticism from earlier liberal-communitarian 
debates. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 318–20 (1985) (explaining how communitarian politics, 
touted as an alternative to liberalism, would continue to oppress individuals); 
see also Schragger & Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, supra 
note 134, at 945–49 (criticizing religious institutionalism for lacking a clear 
limit to church power). 
 164. See, e.g., Gladden Pappin, Toward a Party of the State, AM. AFF., Spring 
2019, at 149, 153–56, https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2019/02/toward-a 
-party-of-the-state/ [https://perma.cc/U8BC-Q9ZE]; Adrian Vermeule, Integra-
tion from Within, AM. AFF., Spring 2018, at 208, https://americanaffairsjournal 
.org/2018/02/integration-from-within/ [https://perma.cc/GRS6-S924] (reviewing 
DENEEN, supra note 10); Edmund Waldstein, An Integralist Manifesto, FIRST 
THINGS (Oct. 2017), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2017/10/an-integralist 
-manifesto [https://perma.cc/L3X4-9ATH] (reviewing ANDREW WILLARD JONES, 
BEFORE CHURCH AND STATE: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER IN THE SACRAMENTAL 
KINGDOM OF ST. LOUIS IX (2017)).  
 165. Pope Pius IX, Syllabus of Errors (1864), http://www.papalencyclicals 
.net/pius09/p9syll.htm [https://perma.cc/PS7E-JZT7].  
 166. Sarah Shortall, When Catholicism Embraced Modernity, BOS. REV. 
(Aug. 10, 2018), http://bostonreview.net/philosophy-religion/sarah-shortall 
-when-catholicism-embraced-modernity [https://perma.cc/GG5M-77MX] (re-
viewing JAMES CHAPPEL, CATHOLIC MODERN: THE CHALLENGE OF TOTALITARI-
ANISM AND THE REMAKING OF THE CHURCH (2018)). 
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olic doctrine, especially after the Second Vatican Council en-
dorsed freedom of conscience in the 1960s.167 But antiliberal-
ism’s resurgence has been accompanied by the reassertion of 
radical, and reactionary, theological views.168  
Catholic integralism calls for the establishment of a confes-
sional state.169 Advocates are unabashed about rejecting reli-
gious disestablishment. Consider Patrick Brennan, a law profes-
sor contemplating what a Christian constitution in a 
predominantly Christian nation might look like. The “defining 
mark of a Christian Commonwealth” is that  
it submits to Christ the King as the supreme lawgiver. This is tradi-
tional Catholic doctrine. A true Christian constitution would take as 
its alpha and its omega Christ the King and, at His command, His 
Church, and this plainly is not the stuff of garden-variety contempo-
rary political thrust and parry. On the contrary, it is as obvious as the 
North Star on a clear night that contemporary conservatives and neo-
cons alike are no more likely than today’s liberals or libertarians to 
affirm or even good-naturedly to entertain the thesis I shall defend: 
The ultimate end of the project of Christian constitutionalism is to lead 
human persons to the supernatural common good, the God of Christian 
revelation, but first, in service of that ultimate end, to lead human per-
sons proximately to the natural common good, ‘the virtuous life of the 
whole,’ through subordination to the divine law . . . .170  
 
 167. Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church 
in the Modern World] (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_ 
councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_ 
en.html [https://perma.cc/SU6W-7GV3] (“Conscience is the most secret core and 
sanctuary of man.”). 
 168. See, e.g., Ash Milton, After Freedom: Catholic Political Theology in the 
Age of Liberal Crisis, PALLADIUM: GOVERNANCE FUTURISM (Dec. 26, 2018), 
https://palladiummag.com/2018/12/26/after-freedom-catholic-political-theology 
-in-the-age-of-liberal-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/2XB9-7YNZ]; Gladden J. Pappin, 
Liberalism Against the Church, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 2019), https://www 
.firstthings.com/article/2019/02/liberalism-against-the-church [https://perma 
.cc/95FH-3DUU] (reviewing ROSENBLATT, supra note 47); Joseph G. Trabbic, 
The Catholic Church, the State, and Liberalism, PUB. DISCOURSE (May 2, 2018), 
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/05/21405/ [https://perma.cc/KZD2 
-PCBJ] 
 169. See Pink, supra note 24 (“Integralism—the need for a confessional 
Catholic state—is part of Catholic teaching about grace.”); see also Edmund 
Waldstein, Integralism in Three Sentences, JOSIAS (Oct. 17, 2016), https:// 
thejosias.com/2016/10/17/integralism-in-three-sentences/ [https://perma.cc/ 
JX6W-MX6V] (advocating “man’s temporal end is subordinated to his eternal 
end” and, thus, “the temporal power must be subordinated to the spiritual 
power”). 
 170. Patrick McKinley Brennan, An Essay on Christian Constitutionalism: 
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Brennan is a minority voice—few American Catholics advo-
cate for a confessional state. And yet the antiliberal revival has 
generated a serious debate among conservative Catholics about 
the reach of the antiliberal critique.171 This is a narrow debate, 
to be sure, since all believe that core aspects of actually-existing 
liberalism are irredeemable. But some imagine a kind of tense 
standoff with the liberal state that retains some core liberal com-
mitments, such as rights of conscience.172  
Others see an inevitable clash between civilizations, not un-
like Eliot’s description of conflict between Christians and pa-
gans. Adrian Vermeule, a Harvard law professor with 
Schmittian sympathies, has emerged as a leading proponent of 
this view. Placing himself explicitly within the antiliberal tradi-
tion,173 Vermeule claims that liberalism is a religion. The “main 
tradition of liberalism,” he argues, “is in fact a liturgy, centred 
on a sacramental celebration of the progressive overcoming of 
the darkness of bigotry and unreason.”174 Vermeule is not unique 
here. This language could come from Schmitt, Eliot, Smith, or 
Himmelfarb. It is a trope of the antiliberal canon to decry “the 
secularized soteriology of the Enlightenment, the narrative of 
Progress.”175  
 
Building in the Divine Style, for the Common Good(s), 16 RUTGERS J.L. & RELI-
GION 478, 482 (2015). 
 171. See Adrian Vermeule, As Secular Liberalism Attacks the Church, Cath-
olics Can’t Afford To Be Nostalgic, CATH. HERALD (Jan. 5, 2018), https:// 
catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2018/01/05/as-secular-liberalism 
-attacks-the-church-catholics-cant-afford-to-be-nostalgic/ [https://perma.cc/ 
VE33-B9FC] (criticizing Catholic traditionalists for rejecting integralism and 
for failing to see that “[t]here is no reason to think that a stable, long-term rap-
prochement between Catholicism and the liberal state is realistically feasible”); 
Edmund Waldstein, Gelysian Dyarchy at Notre Dame, JOSIAS (Nov. 4, 2018), 
https://thejosias.com/2018/11/04/gelasian-dyarchy-at-notre-dame/ [https:// 
perma.cc/495S-CVYM] (discussing a debate at Notre Dame between Catholic 
integralists and “Whig Thomist” liberals about the proper response to the Amer-
ican experiment in religious freedom). 
 172. Cf. Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Defending American Classical Liberalism, 
NAT’L REV. (June 11, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/ 
06/american-classical-liberalism-response-to-radical-catholics/ [https://perma 
.cc/UBN8-VCEE] (rejecting “‘radical’ Catholic” critiques of American liberalism 
advanced by Deneen, Vermeule, Dreher, and others).  
 173. See Vermeule, supra note 63 (“[T]he relentless dynamic of liberalism 
tends to undermine the ‘peace, security and order’ that liberalism itself prom-
ises.”). 
 174. Vermeule, supra note 171.  
 175. Vermuele, supra note 22. 
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Another standard antiliberal argument is that liberalism 
and communism are the twin offspring of the Enlightenment.176 
Vermeule follows this script as well, arguing that both ideologies 
were “children of the Enlightenment, raised in the same nursery 
of the Revolution . . . [with] the same inner logic, the same intel-
lectual structure, and the same dynamics over time.”177 He re-
jects, as does the antiliberal tradition, any real distinction be-
tween the liberal and communist state. The professed 
commitment to the freedom of thought and belief that suppos-
edly distinguishes liberal states from communist ones is a chi-
mera. The insidiousness of liberal society is that while it “cele-
brates toleration, diversity, and free inquiry . . . in practice it 
features a spreading social, cultural, and ideological conform-
ity.”178 
Liberal individuals are, as is common in this genre, lonely, 
desiccated, detached, and searching for meaning in a world that 
liberalism has created. “Because liberalism tends to dissolve in-
termediate institutions and traditional groupings—family, com-
munity, church—liberal man craves belonging and member-
ship.”179 Moreover, intellectuals—“freethinkers”180—are misled. 
They are liberals “due not just to fear of social reprisals and 
shaming, but also to self-deception and the lack of any other com-
prehensive view that would give them the self-confidence to 
think and speak against liberalism.”181 
What is to be done about liberalism and the liberal state? 
Vermeule rejects those traditionalist conservatives who “hope 
for a truce” between Christianity and aggressive liberalism.182 
Instead, like Eliot before him, Vermeule advocates a Christian 
society—a Catholic state—and he reproaches those antiliberals 
who are insufficiently committed to realizing such a new order. 
 
 176. See LEGUTKO, supra note 10, at 155–75 (critiquing the Enlightenment 
driven development of liberal and communist criticisms of Christianity); CARL 
SCHMITT, ROMAN CATHOLICISM AND POLITICAL FORM 34–39 (G.L. Ulmen trans. 
& ann., Praeger 1996) (1923) (discussing the development of liberalism and com-
munism following the Enlightenment and positioning both as enemies of Roman 
Catholicism). 
 177. Vermeule, supra note 22.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Vermeule, supra note 171. 
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One cannot compromise when salvation is at stake. The “forces 
of secular progressive liberalism” are too dangerous and too pow-
erful.183  
But how does such a state come about? Here, Vermeule flirts 
with the Christian nationalist movements in Poland and Hun-
gary.184 And programmatically, borrowing from Schmitt, Ver-
meule suggests that Catholics engage in “flexible collaboration” 
with “pagan kings and powers”—to use whatever tactics and 
make whatever political alliances are necessary to achieve their 
aims.185 He urges Christians to engage in politics, but always on 
the understanding that “[n]o one temporal ideology, no set polit-
ical program, can limit the freedom of the Church. As the inher-
itor and baptizer of the universal pretensions of the Roman Em-
pire, the Church acts in all lands under an infinite variety of 
political conditions.”186 What is important is the long-term goal: 
“to bear witness to the Lord and to expand his one, holy, Catholic 
and apostolic Church to the ends of the earth.”187  
 
 183. Id. Liberalism is even responsible for the Catholic Church’s epidemic of 
child sex abuse in the twentieth century. The implicit suggestion is that liber-
alism has corrupted the Church hierarchy; the Church would be better posi-
tioned to prevent child sex abuse in a Catholic state. Responding to the claim 
that integralists must account for the Catholic Church’s conduct in child abuse 
cases, Vermeule writes that “[t]he necessary comparison involves (1) liberal au-
thorities under liberalism; (2) Church authorities under liberalism; and (3) 
Church authorities under integralism. Abuses in Boston in the 1970s (e.g.) tell 
us something about (2), but little about (3) and nothing at all about (1).” Adrian 
Vermeule (@Vermeullarmine), TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:02 PM), https:// 
twitter.com/Vermeullarmine/status/951590066337480736 [https://perma.cc/ 
8H8J-2QPG]. He also claims that “the Church under integralism has accounta-
bility mechanisms it actually lacks under liberalism.” Adrian Vermeule  
(@Vermeullarmine), TWITTER (Jan. 11, 2018, 5:09 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
Vermeullarmine/status/951591842021339138 [https://perma.cc/NY6S-JZ8M]. 
 184. See Adrian Vermeule, Liberalism’s Fear, JOSIAS (May 9, 2018), 
https://thejosias.com/2018/05/09/liberalisms-fear/ [https://perma.cc/37LE 
-AWUS] (questioning liberal criticism of Poland and Hungary’s new political 
regimes); cf. Rick Hills, Adrian Vermeule’s Anti-Liberal Chic?, PRAWFSBLAWG 
(May 11, 2018), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/adrian 
-vermeles-anti-liberal-chic.html [https://perma.cc/CRN5-ZRJU] (suggesting 
that Vermeule’s comments may be aimed at simply riling up liberalism’s advo-
cates, not an actual viewpoint). 
 185. Vermeule, supra note 24; see also Adrian Vermeule, The Ark of Tradi-
tion, RUSSELL KIRK CTR.: U. BOOKMAN (Nov. 19, 2017), https://kirkcenter.org/ 
reviews/the-ark-of-tradition/ [https://perma.cc/93HA-4UZR] (reviewing 
SCHMITT, supra note 176). 
 186. Vermeule, supra note 24. 
 187. Id. 
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In this, Vermeule again echoes Eliot and the long tradition 
of religious antiliberalism. Liberalism—whether in the guise of 
“modern paganism,” humanism, or secularism—is described as 
an ideology as powerful and as all-encompassing as communism 
or fascism.188 What follows is that liberalism has to be defeated 
at all costs. This view is not appreciably different from the nine-
teenth century Church’s position under Pope Pius IX. Contem-
porary integralism is continuous with a long line of anti-modern 
thought within the Catholic Church. What is striking is the re-
vival of integralism in the first third of the twenty-first century, 
after an over 250-year American history of religious pluralism 
and the instantiation of disestablishment and free exercise un-
der the First Amendment. 
There is no originalist claim here. Antiliberals are content 
to criticize the “Godless” Constitution brought into being by a 
group of Enlightenment Founders who rejected church hierarchy 
and were skeptical of inherited authority.189 The antiliberal tra-
dition is consciously committed to a longer-term project. An-
tiliberals tend to measure time in millennia as opposed to centu-
ries, though often they identify the current moment as a 
profound turning point and use the existing political regime as 
an example of how Western liberal society has lost its way.190  
In the present time, the asserted collapse of religious liberty 
in the West is the harbinger of liberalism’s corruption. According 
to this line of thought, liberals are oppressing Christians and 
other orthodox believers, specifically through laws that require 
equal treatment of gays and lesbians, the provision of contracep-
tives and other health care to female employees and their de-
pendents, and the recognition of same-sex marriage.191 The lib-
eral state’s hostility to Christians is a matter of fact for religious 
antiliberal writers. They write as if Christians are being directly 
and purposefully targeted by the regulatory state. For some an-
tiliberals, it would be enough if Christians could be left alone—
freed from the requirements of civil law in a significant range of 
cases. But for integralists like Vermeule, the conflict between 
 
 188. See Vermeule, supra note 22 (“The eschaton of radical freedom for all is 
inevitable . . . and therefore it is essential that every good citizen accept liberal-
ism (communism) in his heart . . . .”). 
 189. See Brennan, supra note 170, at 528. 
 190. See Vermeule, supra note 173 (discussing liberalism’s attempts to 
change “settled mores of millennia”). 
 191. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 282–300. 
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Christians and liberals is world-historic, inevitable, and ongo-
ing. And it can only end with a Christian state.192 
III.  THE COLLAPSE OF CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE   
The antiliberal revival surveyed above is, in large part, a 
reflection and response to the sense of present-day cultural siege 
on the part of religious conservatives. But it has deeper roots. 
Reactionary thought is embedded in the Western political and 
philosophical tradition.193 It would be a mistake to dismiss con-
temporary radical antiliberal diatribes as politically and aca-
demically fringe, even if they are not often asserted in polite com-
pany. Liberalism’s discontents are a varied and vocal group. And 
the asserted crisis of liberalism is not taking place only in aca-
demic settings or in the pages (or websites) of religiously con-
servative periodicals.  
For our purposes, the antiliberal revival is important be-
cause it is quietly making inroads into constitutional discourse. 
There is rarely a directly observable relationship between theory 
and practice, but modes of thought can provide justifications for 
doctrinal shifts or rationalize them after the fact. Religious an-
tiliberalism is part of a broader discourse that often focuses on 
the Supreme Court’s hostility to religion or disregard for reli-
gious sensibilities. Antiliberal thought asserts that liberalism 
oppresses across all domains of thought and action—in the fam-
ily, the market, and the state.194 Constitutional doctrine as it has 
enforced liberal separationism is a species of that oppression. 
Antiliberal critiques thus provide normative and justificatory 
support for courts already suspicious of existing separationism.  
There is no question that the Supreme Court’s Religion 
Clause doctrine has moved sharply against separationism over 
the last two decades.195 The general doctrinal pattern has been 
 
 192. For further discussion, see generally Micah Schwartzman & Jocelyn 
Wilson, The Unreasonableness of Catholic Integralism, SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
(Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper Series No. 2019-43, 
2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3436376 (surveying 
and criticizing integralist views).  
 193. See generally HOLMES, supra note 7 (tracing and discussing the roots of 
antiliberalism in Western thought).  
 194. Schwartzman & Wilson, supra note 192, at 14 (discussing “a ‘post-lib-
eral’ or integralist view in which liberalism is seen as a relentless, oppressive, 
and theological enemy”). 
 195. See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Establishment Clause 
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a narrowing of the Establishment Clause and a broadening of 
free exercise. With respect to the Establishment Clause, in 
American Legion v. American Humanist Ass’n, the Court re-
cently held that state sponsorship of a forty-foot Latin cross did 
not constitute an impermissible endorsement of Christianity.196 
The Court further held that long-standing religious monuments 
and practices enjoy a presumption of constitutionality.197 Simi-
larly, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court rejected an Es-
tablishment Clause challenge to a town’s practice of opening 
board meetings with explicitly sectarian and mainly Christian 
prayers.198 In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia v. Comer, 
the Court held that the government must fund a church play-
ground resurfacing project on equal terms as nonreligious 
schools,199 raising the possibility of mandatory funding for reli-
gious schools’ core mission.200  
On the free exercise side, by contrast, the doctrine has been 
expansionist. In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission, the Court invalidated application of Colorado’s an-
tidiscrimination law to a Christian baker who denied service to 
a gay couple,201 opening the door to the possibility of broader re-
ligious exemptions from civil rights law. In Burwell v. Hobby 
 
Inversion and the Bladensburg Cross Case, in AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, SU-
PREME COURT REVIEW 2018–2019, at 21, 24 (2019). 
 196. 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).  
 197. Id. at 2085. 
 198. 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
 199. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
 200. The Court’s recent certiorari decisions suggest that some members may 
be ready to expand this precedent. In one case, the Montana Supreme Court 
struck down a state law requiring tax credits for religious education because it 
violated the state’s constitution. The Court granted certiorari for an appeal 
claiming that the decision violates the Free Exercise Clause by excluding reli-
gious education. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 435 P.3d 603 (Mont. 2018), 
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2777 (2019). In another case, the Court denied certiorari 
from a New Jersey Supreme Court decision upholding a historic preservation 
program that excluded religious buildings. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Jus-
tices Alito and Gorsuch, wrote a statement agreeing with the denial on proce-
dural grounds, but indicated his view that the state’s actions violated the Free 
Exercise Clause. Morris Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom from Reli-
gion Found., 139 S. Ct. 909, 909 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., statement respecting 
the denial of certiorari) (mem.) (“In my view, the decision of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court is in serious tension with this Court’s religious equality prece-
dents.”). 
 201. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
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Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court applied the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act (RFRA) to a for-profit corporation and granted a re-
ligious exemption from federal regulations mandating coverage 
of contraception in health insurance policies for employees.202 
And in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 
the Court held that churches are immune from employment dis-
crimination suits by “ministers” and that the category of minis-
ter should be construed broadly to include a teacher of mostly 
secular subjects.203  
Despite the Court’s supposed hostility toward religion, the 
“pro-religion” party has been on the winning side of almost all of 
the First Amendment and statutory free exercise cases that the 
Court has heard in the last decade. A glaring exception is Trump 
v. Hawaii,204 the travel ban case, which rejected an Establish-
ment Clause challenge to an immigration ban motivated by the 
President’s explicit animus toward Muslims.205  
We are not suggesting that each of these cases taken indi-
vidually represents a break with liberal principles. These cases 
have been decided for the most part within the terms of liberal 
discourse. The Court recites and applies the procedural princi-
ples of neutrality, nondiscrimination, and private choice.206 But 
that discourse is clearly under strain, creating inconsistencies 
that suggest a larger cultural or attitudinal shift rather than a 
principled application of settled principles. The Court’s willing-
ness to remake church-state jurisprudence reflects a broader cri-
tique of liberal separationism. The role of that critique in the po-
litical economy of the Religion Clauses is addressed below in 
Part IV. But before turning to the future of church-state juris-
prudence, we first identify the doctrinal tensions that suggest its 
more recent collapse.  
A. RELIGION’S SPECIALNESS 
We start with a basic anomaly. The Supreme Court’s Reli-
gion Clause decisions are conflicted over whether religious peo-
ple, organizations, and activities must be accorded the same 
 
 202. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 203. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
 204. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 205. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 168–69. 
 206. See infra Part IV.D. 
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treatment as their nonreligious analogs, or whether those activ-
ities, organizations, and people are meant to receive special 
treatment. Whether religion is “special” shows up doctrinally in 
a number of ways.207 The funding cases ask whether religious 
activities can or must receive funding from the government on 
equal terms with equivalent secular activities.208 The exemptions 
cases ask whether religiously motivated actors are entitled to re-
ceive exemptions from general laws that nonreligious individu-
als do not receive.209 And the government speech cases ask 
whether the government can make religious statements or give 
religious reasons for laws on the same basis as it makes nonreli-
gious statements or gives secular reasons for laws.210 Religion is 
special to the extent it receives either better or worse treatment 
compared to its secular analog.211 In the past, the Establishment 
Clause has been read to disallow significant government funding 
of religious activities,212 to limit government religious speech,213 
and to prohibit laws that lack a predominant secular purpose.214 
The Free Exercise Clause has been read to permit215 and some-
times to require religious exemptions from laws that otherwise 
 
 207. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1353–55. 
 208. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 
2012 (2017); Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law 
v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); see also 
2 GREENAWALT, supra note 39, at 194–206 (discussing cases regarding equal 
access to public facilities for religious activities); Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Reli-
gion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008).  
 209. Compare Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014) (ap-
plying RFRA to require a religious exemption from the contraception mandate 
for a religious for-profit corporation), with March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. 
Supp. 3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying the Equal Protection Clause to require 
an exemption from the contraception mandate for a secular nonprofit).  
 210. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); McCreary 
County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 
U.S. 290 (2000); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Stone v. Graham, 
449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 211. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1353.  
 212. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (invalidating state 
law that provided government funding to reimburse private religious schools for 
textbooks and teacher salaries). 
 213. See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 (upholding Establishment Clause 
challenge to public school’s prayer practice at high school football games). 
 214. See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881 (declaring that the practice 
of displaying the Ten Commandments in county courthouses was unconstitu-
tional because it lacked a secular purpose). 
 215. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
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bind nonreligious actors.216 Religion is thus specially disabled, 
but also specially protected.217  
This regime, however, has been collapsing for some time un-
der pressure from a general nondiscrimination principle.218 Most 
recently in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 
the Court struck down a state law that prevented government 
funding of religious enterprises in the context of playground re-
surfacing.219 Trinity Lutheran follows a line of cases in the 1990s, 
culminating in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,220 that permitted but 
did not require indirect state funding of religious schools through 
a school voucher program.221 Zelman rejected the reasoning of a 
previous line of cases holding that funding religious schools, ex-
cept under narrow circumstances, violated the Establishment 
Clause.222 Trinity Lutheran is three steps removed from those 
precedents. The Court has moved from a regime that disallowed 
most kinds of direct funding to a regime that permitted indirect 
funding and now to a regime that requires direct funding. And 
 
(1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause allows but does not require reli-
gious exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws). Although the 
Court’s decision in Smith did not give especially favorable treatment to religion, 
it left in place earlier lines of cases that provided exemptions and permitted the 
development of federal statutes that have granted significant special protec-
tions for religious free exercise, even at the cost of significant harms to third 
parties. See infra notes 315–16 and accompanying text; see also NeJaime & 
Siegel, supra note 6, at 2562–67; Sepper, supra note 5, at 1505–07. And even so, 
there has been constant pressure from religious conservatives in recent years 
to overturn Smith. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 162–63 (dis-
cussing efforts to overrule Smith).  
 216. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (recognizing ministerial exception in part under 
the Free Exercise Clause); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting 
religious exemption from compulsory school attendance law); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (granting religious exemption for unemployment com-
pensation benefits).  
 217. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1356–58. 
 218. This doctrinal trajectory was noticed already more than a decade ago. 
See Feldman, supra note 1, at 676.  
 219. 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). 
 220. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 221. See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 39, at 405–14 (surveying the permissive 
funding cases leading up to the Court’s decision in Zelman). 
 222. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, Sec-
tarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 917, 919 (2003) (“Zelman represents the most recent and dramatic move 
away from Separationism.”).  
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though the Court put to the side whether such funding is re-
quired outside the context of playground resurfacing,223 the di-
rection of the doctrine is clear.224 
The funding cases are driven by a seemingly compelling an-
tidiscrimination norm, according to which religious organiza-
tions that look just like secular ones should not be penalized by 
restrictions on government funding. Religious traditionalists 
and conservatives have long chafed against funding restrictions, 
especially with regards to private religious schools.225 They have 
asserted, now with some success, that a basic equal protection 
theory should apply to such discriminations.226  
Similarly, some have argued that religious reasons should 
be treated the same as secular reasons in providing legitimate 
grounds for justifying law.227 Here we can see an application of 
the antiliberal critique of the secular/religious divide. If religious 
argument is no different from other kinds of ideological argu-
ment, then it should be included on the same terms in the polit-
ical domain. The rejection of the secular/religious distinction—a 
staple of liberal thought—means that if the state can rely on sec-
ular values, whether in justifying laws or in expressing those 
justifications through government speech, it should be able to 
appeal to religious convictions as well. 
This equal treatment regime, however, does not seem to 
hold when it comes to government regulation of religion. When 
laws burden religion, as opposed to funding or promoting it, a 
different set of concerns emerge. Religious belief is treated as 
unique and uniquely vulnerable to government repression. Ar-
guments are often made that religious claims are special because 
 
 223. Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3 (“This case involves express 
discrimination based on religious identity with respect to playground resurfac-
ing. We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimina-
tion.”). 
 224. See Laycock, supra note 1, at 137–42.  
 225. See FELDMAN, supra note 62, at 215; Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 
328–52.  
 226. See, e.g., Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: 
An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 311, 358–62 (1986).  
 227. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 88, at 655–56; Wolterstorff, supra note 
83, at 180.  
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religious persons are responding to a higher law.228 Religious ac-
commodationists assert that conflicts between secular and reli-
gious laws are especially and uniquely painful for them.229 They 
also claim that religious institutions, unlike secular analogs, 
have a particular and special status, legally and normatively.230 
Under liberal theory, churches are voluntary associations, like 
other associations. But under institutionalist or corporatist the-
ories, churches are much more than that.231  
While religion is not special for purposes of funding, govern-
ment speech, or justifying legislation, it does appear to be special 
for purposes of religious exemptions.232 For example, in holding 
that religious organizations are exempt from antidiscrimination 
laws when making employment decisions about ministers, the 
Supreme Court declared that “the text of the First Amendment 
itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organ-
izations”233—a clear nod to religious institutionalism.234 The 
 
 228. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, “Secular Purpose,” Accommodations, and 
Why Religion Is Special (Enough), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 24, 36–37 
(2013); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DE-
PAUL L. REV. 1, 28–30 (2000); Michael Stokes Paulsen, God Is Great, Garvey Is 
Good: Making Sense of Religious Freedom, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1597, 1611 
(1997); Nicholas Wolterstorff, A Religious Argument for the Civil Right to Free-
dom of Religious Exercise, Drawn from American History, 36 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 535, 555 (2001).  
 229. GARVEY, supra note 142, at 54. 
 230. See BRADY, supra note 27, at 321–24; Michael W. McConnell, Why Pro-
tect Religious Freedom?, 123 YALE L.J. 770, 777 n.34 (2013) (reviewing BRIAN 
LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012)). 
 231. See supra Part II.C. 
 232. One of us has described this combination of views under the label of 
“inclusive accommodation.” Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1359. According to 
this view, religion is not to be treated specially for purposes of the political pro-
cess. It must be included like any other nonreligious ethical or philosophical 
view. But religion warrants special treatment with respect to granting accom-
modations. At the core of this view is a deep asymmetry in the treatment of 
religion—sometimes religion is special, and sometimes it is not. And the ques-
tion always for inclusive accommodationists is whether asymmetry can be jus-
tified. See id. at 1378–85 (arguing that none of the arguments offered for inclu-
sive accommodation “seem capable of resolving this underlying theoretical 
inconsistency”).  
 233. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 
U.S. 171, 189 (2012). 
 234. Religious institutionalists welcomed Hosanna-Tabor as confirming that 
their views now have a firmer foothold within constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., 
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Court has also applied RFRA and the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) to protect the rights of 
religious believers, holding that “[r]eligious accommoda-
tions . . . need not ‘come packaged with benefits to secular enti-
ties.’”235 The Court has found no difficulty extending religious 
exemptions to large for-profit corporations, with the result that 
the religious owners of Hobby Lobby can opt-out of complying 
with a federal health care mandate.236 Companies and persons 
with equivalent secular conscientious objections, however, gen-
erally do not receive such beneficial treatment under RFRA, 
RLUIPA, or the First Amendment.237 
By contrast with the emerging regime, the separationist 
church-state settlement maintained a balance in treating reli-
gion distinctively. It disallowed government support for religious 
activities, but it also required exemptions for religious dissent-
ers.238 Religion was exceptional in two ways. Religiously moti-
vated activities were burdened to the extent that the govern-
ment could not directly support them, either through funding or 
through the enactment of laws directed to advance religious pur-
poses. At the same time, certain regulations that burdened reli-
gious conscientious objectors were lifted.  
The language of equal treatment, however, has now been 
put to one-sided use, most obviously in the funding context. 
Equal treatment arguments fit comfortably in a liberal antidis-
crimination schema; government should treat religious and non-
religious citizens with equal regard.239 But this one-sided equal 
 
Richard W. Garnett, The Worms and the Octopus: Religious Freedom, Plural-
ism, and Conservatism, in NOMOS LVI: AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 160, 175–76 
(Sanford V. Levinson et al. eds., 2016).  
 235. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (quoting Corp. of Pre-
siding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 
327, 338 (1987)). 
 236. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 237. See, e.g., Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 
867 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2017) (rejecting statutory and constitutional claims for 
exemption from the federal contraception mandate for secular, non-profit, anti-
abortion organizations).  
 238. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 
YALE L.J. 1611, 1633–39 (1993); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal 
Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 222 (1992). But see Schwartzman, supra note 
27, at 1390–94 (criticizing this symmetrical or balancing view under the label 
of “exclusive accommodation”).  
 239. See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 15, at 28–31; TEBBE, supra note 
16, at 71–73.  
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treatment raises a concern that what is really happening is 
something else: that religious citizens receive more favorable 
treatment across the scope of government activities than do non-
religious citizens.  
Moreover, the asymmetrical application of the equal treat-
ment principle is difficult if not impossible to defend on the basis 
of liberal principles.240 What differentiates religious conscien-
tious objectors from nonreligious ones, who may have equally 
deeply felt objections to a coercive law? Is there not an equal pro-
tection problem when the religious owners of Hobby Lobby can 
be exempted from the requirement to provide contraception cov-
erage to their employees, but the nonreligious owners of a com-
pany who have secular conscientious objections to the same law 
cannot?241 If it is suspect for government to distribute benefits 
and burdens based on a citizen’s source of belief, why does that 
suspicion only apply to laws that disfavor religious persons?  
This lack of symmetry has been defended by some on the 
grounds that religion is so important that religious actors should 
be supported by the state as well as exempted from the state’s 
laws.242 Religious believers can encourage the government to 
adopt religiously motivated laws, to provide monies to religious 
persons and organizations, and to express or endorse religious 
convictions in public just as they might express or endorse non-
religious views. At the same time, they are entitled to be exempt 
from government regulation in many cases. Within the discourse 
of equal treatment, however, this dual treatment of religious be-
lievers is puzzling. One needs a theory of religion and its privi-
leged place to justify treating citizens so differently on account 
of the nature of their beliefs. A liberal account—whatever the 
rhetoric of equal treatment—has (and should have) difficulty do-
ing so. The demands of equality are too obvious.  
A regime of equal treatment is available. It is contained in 
the human rights doctrines that demand respect for rights of 
 
 240. See Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1377–401. 
 241. Compare, e.g., Real Alternatives, 867 F.3d at 348–53 (denying an Equal 
Protection Clause challenge for an exemption from the contraception mandate 
for a secular nonprofit), with March for Life v. Burwell, 128 F. Supp. 3d 116, 
126–28 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (applying the Equal Protection Clause to require an 
exemption from the contraception mandate for a secular nonprofit). 
 242. See Thomas C. Berg, Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Ob-
jectors, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139, 165–66 (2018). 
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conscience, whether religious in nature or otherwise.243 In the 
context of American constitutional law, Christopher Eisgruber 
and Larry Sager have promoted a liberal theory of equal concern 
and respect for all citizens regardless of the nature of their 
deeply held convictions.244 It is symmetrical insofar as it treats 
religious and nonreligious claims equally for purposes of both 
free exercise and disestablishment.245 Eisgruber and Sager are 
persuasive that religious asymmetry is indefensible. They and 
others have urged treating religious claims like other compara-
ble ethical claims in evaluating whether the government is re-
quired or permitted to provide support, endorsement, or exemp-
tions. Secular and religious claims alike would be tested against 
the same criteria.246 
The doctrine is moving away from such symmetry, however. 
With respect to exemptions, the doctrine had been moving to-
ward regulatory equality. In Employment Division, Department 
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,247 decided almost thirty 
years ago, the Court limited the special treatment of religious 
believers under the First Amendment when it held that the Free 
Exercise Clause does not require exemptions when a law is neu-
tral and generally applicable. Since Smith was decided, however, 
it has been roundly criticized, and mostly replaced by statutory 
protections for religious believers.248 The Court has also found 
its own ways around Smith. Hosanna-Tabor barely engaged 
with Smith’s reasoning even as the ministerial exception limits 
 
 243. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, A GLOBAL POLITICAL MORALITY: HUMAN 
RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 84–85 (2017) (arguing for a hu-
man right of “moral freedom” that would extend a regime of religious exemp-
tions to those with nonreligious claims of conscience); Schwartzman, Religion 
as a Legal Proxy, supra note 16, at 1099–101. 
 244. EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 15, at 18–20. 
 245. Schwartzman, supra note 27, at 1374–77 (discussing Eisgruber and 
Sager’s theory as a version of “inclusive nonaccommodation,” which “takes as 
its fundamental premise the equality of religious and secular moral views”). 
 246. Which is not to say that we agree entirely with Eisgruber and Sager’s 
view, only that we share their basic premise about the need for equal treatment 
of religious and nonreligious ethical and philosophical doctrines. See Schwartz-
man, supra note 27, at 1395–401 (arguing for an alternative to Eisgruber and 
Sager’s account because of concerns about the inclusion of religious convictions 
as grounds for legal decision making).  
 247. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 248. On the rise and fall and rise again of religious accommodations, see Ira 
C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 35 (2014). 
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Smith’s central holding.249 As noted above, the Court in Ho-
sanna-Tabor seemed to endorse an institutionalist conception of 
religious freedom. Also, in Masterpiece Cakeshop, which invali-
dated the application of a neutral and generally applicable pub-
lic accommodations law, the Court avoided Smith by holding 
that the civil rights law had not been applied neutrally.250  
Smith is in decline if not dead.251 But while Smith collapses, 
equal treatment arguments have gained traction in the funding 
area. In other words, the equal treatment principle is being de-
ployed in cases that benefit religious actors, but not where it 
works against them.  
A liberal account of the Religion Clauses does not readily 
permit this double-standard.252 But as we have already de-
scribed, antiliberal thought draws a relevant distinction be-
tween transcendent religiosity, which characterizes the beliefs 
of “Christians” and other “devout” believers, and secularized “pa-
gans,” or those who accept immanent conceptions of value.253 It 
is permissible, under this view, to treat the former more favora-
bly than the latter, as their commitments are of a different kind. 
There is no inconsistency on this account, as the principle of 
equality simply does not apply as between the two groups.  
In addition, antiliberal theories provide a justification for 
religious favoritism, in part as compensation for a background 
 
 249. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 951, 954–56 
(2012) (criticizing the Court’s attempt to distinguish Smith); Ira C. Lupu & Rob-
ert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1265, 1292 (2017) 
(describing the Court’s treatment of Smith as a “woefully inadequate explana-
tion of why Smith is not fatal to the ministerial exception”). 
 250. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 138–45, 154–57 (criti-
cizing the Court’s holding that the state failed to apply its public accommoda-
tions law in a manner consistent with religious neutrality). 
 251. See id. at 162 (noting that in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Gorsuch 
and Justice Alito signaled their interest in reversing Smith). And just in case 
the signal in Masterpiece Cakeshop was not received, less than a year later, Jus-
tice Alito—this time joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh—is-
sued another statement effectively inviting challenges to Smith. See Kennedy 
v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 252. See supra Part I. 
 253. See supra Part II.B. 
  
1392 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1341 
 
liberal regime that is purportedly biased against religious believ-
ers.254 The antiliberal critique sets the stage for a regime of sep-
arate spheres or institutional sovereignty. Once one embraces 
the idea that liberalism is a religion, one can treat the liberal 
state and the church as akin to competing religious sovereigns. 
The liberal regime of equal treatment is replaced with, or subor-
dinated to, an antiliberal regime of church freedom.  
B. NEUTRALITY 
The problem of religion’s specialness is related to the ques-
tion of what constitutes government “neutrality” concerning re-
ligion. The Court’s Religion Clause decisions are written in 
terms of liberal principles, with religious neutrality perhaps 
foremost among them. But the meaning of neutrality has been a 
moving target, similar to the ways that equal treatment has 
been inconsistently applied. Here again, “neutrality” is being de-
ployed to instantiate a religion-favoring regime, one that under-
cuts liberal premises rather than enforces them.  
First, consider the requirements for neutrality recently de-
bated in Masterpiece Cakeshop.255 Under Smith, neutral laws of 
general applicability do not give rise to a free exercise claim for 
an exemption.256 One would have thought that a public accom-
modations law that applied to gays and lesbians would be such 
a law. Civil rights laws are general and apply to religious as well 
as nonreligious parties; on their face, there is no targeting of a 
particular religion or religion in general.257  
 
 254. See supra Part II.A. 
 255. Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1731 (2018). 
 256. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 
(1990). 
 257. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy affirmed that the state’s public 
accommodation is facially neutral and generally applicable. See Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (“[I]t is a general rule that such [religious and 
philosophical] objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the 
economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and ser-
vices under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.” 
(emphasis added)); see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 154–57 
(defending the neutrality of Colorado’s public accommodations law, both facially 
and as applied in Masterpiece Cakeshop). 
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Nevertheless, in considering the baker’s claim for a religious 
exemption, the Court accepted that the state’s public accommo-
dations law had not been applied neutrally.258 Jack Phillips, the 
baker who refused to bake a cake for a gay couple’s wedding, ar-
gued that the state had discriminated against him and expressed 
hostility toward his religious convictions. That was, in part, be-
cause the Colorado Civil Rights Division rejected a religious dis-
crimination claim brought by another baker—William Jack—
who had asked three different bakers to make cakes with anti-
gay marriage expressions. Phillips claimed that forcing him to 
bake a cake celebrating a gay marriage but not forcing other bak-
ers to bake cakes denigrating such marriage was disparate treat-
ment.259 
What version of neutrality does this violate? The Court’s 
free speech doctrine holds that the government cannot favor 
some messages over others. If Colorado were regulating bakers’ 
messages, permitting bakers to deny service for anti-gay mes-
sages, but not the opposite, would violate a neutrality princi-
ple.260 But Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act regulates the 
grounds for denial of service, not speech.261 Private parties are 
not barred from denying service on the basis of message; what 
they are not allowed to do is deny service based on a protected 
class.262 Phillips denied service based on the protected status of 
his customers; Jack was denied service based on the otherwise 
unprotected content of his requested expression.263 
That the Court accepted Phillips’s disparate treatment 
claim, however, suggests the increasing malleability of neutral-
ity. Civil rights law could not exist if it could not differentiate 
 
 258. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1729.  
 259. Brief for Petitioners at 39–44, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 
(No. 16-111). 
 260. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1733–34. 
 261. Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 143–45. 
 262. See id. at 154–55 (“[Civil rights laws] apply only to denial of service on 
the basis of certain protected characteristics, such as race, ethnicity, religion, 
and sexual orientation. They do not prohibit a baker from refusing to make a 
cake on grounds of politics (for example, Nazi cakes), vulgarity (penis-shaped 
cakes), or aesthetics (red velvet armadillo cakes).” (citation omitted)).  
 263. Id. 
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between permissible grounds for denials of service and imper-
missible ones.264 The state can presumably choose to use its pub-
lic accommodation laws to protect gays and lesbians but not pro-
tect Nazis, Republicans, vegans, nudists, or haters of LGBT 
people. If neutrality requires that all group identities that might 
be associated with a particular product or service (a gay cake, a 
Nazi cake, a vegan cake) be protected equally, it will be quite 
difficult to adopt any civil rights laws at all. Neutrality would 
require that Nazis cannot be refused service if African-Ameri-
cans cannot be refused service. This result follows from import-
ing speech doctrine’s viewpoint neutrality into public accommo-
dations law. 
Neutrality, improperly conceived or applied, can be a de-
stroyer of law. We witnessed this effect during the Lochner era 
when the Court required economic legislation to be even-
handed.265 Free speech law also contains within it the means of 
law’s destruction. Most action involves speech, and so most legal 
regulation can be reimagined as the regulation of speech.266 The 
demand that the state be viewpoint neutral when it regulates 
acts that are infused with speech can lead to law’s demise.267  
Demands for free exercise neutrality exhibit a similar 
power. If every legal regulation impinges on a religious or ideo-
logical belief, then no regulation is evenhanded. The law will af-
fect some kinds of believers more than others. Civil rights laws 
protecting African-Americans will be non-neutral with regards 
 
 264. Id. at 145 (“If distinguishing between lawful denials of service and un-
lawful discrimination is impermissible, then the Supreme Court has destroyed 
civil rights law sub silentio.”). 
 265. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60–62 (1905); see also 2 G. ED-
WARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 404–12 (2016). 
 266. See Leslie Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the “Speech” in “Freedom of 
Speech,” 116 MICH. L. REV. 667, 675–76 (2018) (noting the inexorable expansion 
of activities that courts and litigants have found to implicate speech). 
 267. This phenomenon, sometimes described as free speech or First Amend-
ment Lochnerism, has been much discussed and heavily criticized in recent 
years. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1199, 1212–18 (2015); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 
WIS. L. REV. 133, 176–91 (2016); Howard M. Wasserman, Bartnicki as Lochner: 
Some Thoughts on First Amendment Lochnerism, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 421, 439–
56 (2006). 
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to Christians who believe in white supremacy unless reli-
gious white supremacists also receive protection.268 We have 
fallen into Wechsler’s Brown v. Board of Education-destroying 
“neutral principles” trap.269  
Another meaning of religious neutrality will also be offended 
by most law. If the state cannot influence the religious choices of 
its citizens, even incidentally, then any funding or regulatory 
choice that has the effect of favoring a particular ideology or re-
ligious doctrine will be non-neutral. For example, religious tra-
ditionalists have long argued that public funding of secular 
schools disfavors those who prefer or require that their children 
receive a religious education.270 Secularists receive an education 
paid for by the state, while the devout are required to pay for 
private schools. According to the demands of this account of neu-
trality, the public school system is non-neutral with regards to 
religion, and certainly so if one considers a secular education to 
be religious.271 Indeed, any other funding or regulatory choice 
that might influence or coerce religiously inspired action will be 
non-neutral. Since any and all human activities can be under-
taken for religious reasons, the state’s regulation of any activity 
can be reframed as disparate treatment. This form of neutrality, 
 
 268. The Court rejected this possibility in Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (denying as “patently frivolous” a free 
exercise challenge brought by a restaurant owner who refused service to African 
Americans). 
 269. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Our response, perhaps unsurprisingly, follows 
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 
421 (1960); see also Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle, 
34 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 172 (2019) (defending the religious neutrality of pub-
lic accommodation laws by developing Black’s response to Wechsler in the con-
text of Masterpiece Cakeshop).  
 270. See, e.g., Mozert v. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1058–59 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(holding that public schools can require religious students to read materials that 
offend those students or their parents’ religious beliefs); FELDMAN, supra note 
62, at 90–92; Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”: 
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 581, 589–609 (1993). 
 271. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal 
Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FL. L. 
REV. 909, 1047–59 (2013) (arguing states violate the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments by discriminating on the basis of religion in operating secular pub-
lic schools as taxpayer-funded monopolies).  
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sometimes described as “neutrality of effect,”272 again vitiates 
law. 
Hobby Lobby provides a further example of how the princi-
ple of neutrality can be manipulated to undermine legal regula-
tion. Consider the argument that the contraception mandate was 
not a neutral and generally applicable law under Smith and 
should therefore have triggered strict scrutiny under the Free 
Exercise Clause. Like many employment regulations, the contra-
ception mandate applied differently to large and small employ-
ers.273 The regulations also contained provisions that required 
implementation over time, exempting employers with grandfa-
thered plans from the mandate.274 Hobby Lobby argued that the 
law was not neutral or generally applicable because it contained 
such exceptions, even though these exceptions had nothing to do 
with religion.275 Douglas Laycock and others have argued that a 
law is non-neutral with respect to religion if it contains even a 
single secular exception that undermines the purpose of the 
law.276 This is an almost insurmountable barrier to regulation.277  
If deregulation is the goal, then neutrality’s severe demands 
can be deployed to accomplish it. But here again, neutrality is 
being used selectively. Neutrality is much less demanding when 
the Court considers government religious speech under the Es-
tablishment Clause. In both Town of Greece and American Le-
gion the Court held that specifically Christian government 
 
 272. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 12, at 191–94 (distin-
guishing between neutrality of aim and neutrality of effect and rejecting the 
latter).  
 273. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014) 
(describing exempt and non-exempt employers for the contraception mandate). 
 274. Id. at 2764. 
 275. See id. at 2763–64. 
 276. See Douglas Laycock & Steven T. Collis, Generally Applicable Law and 
the Free Exercise of Religion, 95 NEB. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2016) (“The question is 
whether a single secular analogy is not regulated. The right to free exercise of 
religion is a right to be treated like the most favored analogous secular con-
duct.”). 
 277. See Colin Devine, A Critique of the Secular Exceptions Approach to Re-
ligious Exemptions, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1348, 1352 (2015) (“If religious exemp-
tions must be granted from any law with secular exceptions, they will be 
granted from nearly every law.”). 
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speech is permissible.278 Neutrality was no obstacle in those 
cases to the state’s religious preferentialism.279 
Antiliberal theories provide a basis for such selectivity. An-
tiliberals often assert that the state has never been neutral 
among competing comprehensive doctrines.280 In their view, lib-
eralism and its variants—paganism and secularism—constitute 
the existing political and religious orthodoxy.281 Religious liber-
tarianism in the exemption context is thus an appropriate cor-
rective to an already-existing bias.282 
C. ANIMUS 
The basic idea underlying equal treatment, non-discrimina-
tion, and neutrality is that the state should not favor one reli-
gious denomination over another. This is a central principle of 
disestablishment: the notion that a citizen’s political and eco-
nomic status is not tied to her religious belief and affiliation or 
non-belief and non-affiliation.283 
Like all the core concepts of the Court’s Religion Clause ju-
risprudence, this principle is also under strain. Consider Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s stated preference for monotheism.284 Before his 
death, Justice Scalia promoted a form of religious identity poli-
tics, observing that the government could support a monotheistic 
civic-religious culture.285 This “Judeo-Christian” culture possibly 
included Muslims as monotheists, though it certainly did not in-
clude non-monotheistic religions or nonbelievers.286  
 
 278. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2974 (2019); Town 
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 585, 591 (2014). 
 279. See Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 195, at 55 (“[T]he Court’s 
doctrine is paving the way for a certain kind of religious preferentialism.”). 
 280. See supra Part II.A. 
 281. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
 282. See Sepper, supra note 5, at 1508–12 (discussing “economic libertarian-
ism in a religious garb”).  
 283. See Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 637–38 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]hat 
remarkable guarantee [of the Establishment Clause] means at least this much: 
When the citizens of this country approach their government, they do so only as 
Americans, not as members of one faith or another.”); TEBBE, supra note 16, at 
99–102.  
 284. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893–95 (2005) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 893 (“With respect to public acknowledgment of religious belief, 
it is entirely clear from our Nation’s historical practices that the Establishment 
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Justice Scalia appeared quite comfortable with assimilating 
all religions into a background Christian culture. At one point, 
he claimed that a cross in the context of a war memorial was a 
universal symbol for fallen soldiers, including Jewish war 
dead.287 The Court adopted that same view in its decision in 
American Legion, holding that the Bladensburg Peace Cross was 
erected as a secular symbol of veterans who died in World War I 
and not as an endorsement of Christianity.288 In Town of Greece, 
the Court permitted a town to open its council meetings with 
predominantly sectarian Christian prayers,289 suggesting a tol-
erance for a certain Christian preferentialism. Echoes of Justice 
Brewer’s 1892 claim that “this is a Christian nation”290 can be 
heard.291 
In these recent cases, the Court has rejected application of 
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, which had been applied to 
previous religious display cases.292 Under that test, the state is 
forbidden “from making adherence to a religion relevant in any 
 
Clause permits this disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned dei-
ties, just as it permits the disregard of devout atheists.”). 
 287. At oral argument in Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700 (2010), which in-
volved an Establishment Clause challenge to a Latin cross on federal land, Jus-
tice Scalia expressed indignation at the idea that a crucifix does not represent 
Jewish war dead. In an exchange with Peter Eliasberg, a Jewish lawyer repre-
senting the ACLU, Justice Scalia said, “I don’t think you can leap . . . to the 
conclusion that the only war dead that the cross honors are the Christian war 
dead. I think that’s an outrageous conclusion.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 
39, Salazar, 559 U.S. 700 (No. 08-472); see Caroline Mala Corbin, Justice Scalia, 
the Establishment Clause, and Christian Privilege, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
185, 200–02 (2017) (using Justice Scalia’s comments during the Salazar oral 
argument to demonstrate Christian privilege). 
 288. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019). 
 289. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570, 585 (2014). 
 290. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).  
 291. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Religion and the Roberts Court: The Limits of Reli-
gious Pluralism in Constitutional Law, in RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIB-
ERTY, supra note 133, at 465 (arguing that under the “Roberts Court’s approach 
to the Religion Clauses: Christianity is the unmarked religion”). 
 292. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); see also TEBBE, supra note 16, at 98–112 (defending a principle of 
government nonendorsement, including limits on government religious speech); 
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A Gen-
eral Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1545–51 (2000) (interpreting the en-
dorsement test as a prohibition on expressive harms with respect to religious 
status). 
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way to a person’s standing in the political community.”293 The 
government violates this doctrine when it “sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community.”294 That principle appears to be moribund 
after American Legion and Town of Greece. 
So, too, animus doctrine holds that the government cannot 
engage in acts driven by animus toward a particular religion or 
religious group.295 A species of equal protection law,296 animus 
doctrine holds that hostility or prejudice toward a religious de-
nomination or practice cannot serve as an appropriate basis of 
lawmaking.297 The selective application of animus doctrine, how-
ever, suggests that it also is a concept that has lost its conven-
tional meaning.  
Consider the inconsistent application of animus in Trump v. 
Hawaii, the travel ban case, when compared to its application in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the wedding-vendor case. Along with the 
dissenters in Trump v. Hawaii,298 commentators have repeat-
edly noted the striking disparity.299 In two cases decided in the 
same term, the Court was tasked with determining whether a 
government decision was animated by religious prejudice. In 
 
 293. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 294. Id. at 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 466 U.S. at 688). 
 295. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 523–24 
(1993). 
 296. See WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN 
THE LAW 169 (2017); Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from 
Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 183–84. 
 297. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 137 (“Lukumi stands for 
a basic constitutional principle, which is that the government may not act on 
the basis of animosity toward religion.”). 
 298. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2446–47 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dis-
senting) (“But unlike in Masterpiece, where a state civil rights commission was 
found to have acted without ‘the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quires,’ the government actors in this case will not be held accountable for 
breaching the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious neutrality and toler-
ance.” (citation omitted)).  
 299. See, e.g., Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 168–69 (arguing 
that Trump v. Hawaii “undermined the credibility of the principles articulated 
in Masterpiece,” prohibiting public officials from acting on the basis of animus 
and expressing hostility toward religion); Ilya Somin, The Supreme Court’s In-
defensible Double Standard in the Travel-Ban Case and Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
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Trump v. Hawaii, the Court had before it numerous and exten-
sive statements from the President of the United States, who 
made clear that his executive order banning immigration from 
Muslim-majority countries was intended to prevent Muslims 
from entering the United States.300 The President did not hide 
the fact that the purpose and intent was to enact a “Muslim ban.” 
As a presidential candidate, he called “for a total and complete 
shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,”301 and after 
taking office, as Justice Sotomayor correctly concluded, “he has 
continued to make remarks that a reasonable observer would 
view as an unrelenting attack on the Muslim religion and its fol-
lowers.”302 The Supreme Court, however, refused to apply ani-
mus doctrine to the President’s actions. It simply disregarded 
the significance of his statements in affirming his use of execu-
tive authority to issue the travel ban.303 
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, by contrast, the Court went out of 
its way to find animus toward the Christian baker seeking an 
exemption from Colorado’s public accommodation laws.304 What 
did the Court point to as evidence of religious hostility? Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion cites two instances of individual Col-
orado Civil Rights Commissioners opining about how religious 
belief intersects with public law.305 In the first, a Commissioner 
observed that businesses open to the public need to “compro-
mise.”306 In the second, a Commissioner said that “[f]reedom of 
 
 300. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233, 352 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (Harris, J., concurring) (“This case is remarkable because it features 
just that: a governmental decisionmaker using his own direct communications 
with the public to broadcast — repeatedly, and throughout the course of this 
litigation — an anti-Muslim purpose tied specifically to the challenged ac-
tion. . . . [T]his is not a case in which we need indulge in ‘judicial psychoanalysis’ 
of motive. It is all out in the open.” (citations omitted)), vacated and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 2710 (2018) (mem.). 
 301. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2435 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 302. Id. at 2439. 
 303. Id. at 2418 (majority opinion) (“But the issue before us is not whether 
to denounce the statements. It is instead the significance of those statements in 
reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter 
within the core of executive responsibility. In doing so, we must consider not 
only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Pres-
idency itself.”). 
 304. See Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719, 1729, 1731–32 (2018). 
 305. Id. at 1729. 
 306. Id.  
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religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrim-
ination.”307 Combining these statements with the commission’s 
“disparate treatment” of William Jack, who had requested the 
anti-gay marriage cakes, the Court concluded that the process of 
adjudicating the discrimination claim was unconstitutionally 
tainted by hostility toward religion.308 
Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests that even a modicum of reli-
gious animus should doom the application of an otherwise fa-
cially neutral law.309 In Masterpiece Cakeshop, however, the as-
serted bias of Colorado’s process is hardly convincing. The 
majority opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence assert that 
Christian conservatives were targeted by the Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission.310 But there is no evidence—no legislative 
statements or statements regarding selective enforcement—that 
the antidiscrimination law or the Commission’s enforcement of 
that law were meant to target a specific religious group.311 The 
Court’s justification for looking behind the application of an oth-
erwise neutral and general antidiscrimination law is weak. The 
rationale seems to be that applying the antidiscrimination law 
to religious traditionalists, and not to those who oppose LGBT 
discrimination, evidences bad motive or unequal treatment. 
But compare Trump’s travel ban, for which the evidence of 
anti-Muslim animus is overwhelming.312 The Court ignores that 
 
 307. Id. 
 308. Id. at 1731–32. 
 309. See id. 
 310. Id. at 1730–32; id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 311. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 145 (“In holding that 
the Commission failed to treat Phillips’s claims with neutrality and respect, the 
Court improperly applied free exercise doctrine to the facts of the case, finding 
unconstitutional hostility and intolerance where there were none.”); see also 
Bernard Bell, A Lemon Cake: Ascribing Religious Motivation in Administrative 
Adjudications—A Comment on Masterpiece Cakeshop (Part II), YALE J. ON 
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 20, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/nc/a-lemon-cake 
-ascribing-religious-motivation-in-administrative-adjudications-a-comment-on 
-Masterpiece-cakeshop-part-ii [https://perma.cc/CL3B-YQYH]; Marty Leder-
man, State “Hostility” to Religion Without Religious Discrimination?: The Unex-
pected Free Exercise Issue Lurking in Masterpiece Cakeshop, BALKINIZATION 
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/12/state-hostility-to-religion 
-without.html [https://perma.cc/2RXT-BWA]; Jim Oleske, Justice Gorsuch, Kip-
pahs, and False Analogies in Masterpiece Cakeshop, TAKE CARE (June 19, 
2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/justice-gorsuch-kippahs-and-false 
-analogies-in-Masterpiece-cakeshop [https://perma.cc/HP2N-LW4M]. 
 312. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 168 (“But if there was a 
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evidence, instead asserting that because the immigration ban is 
facially nondiscriminatory, it can pass constitutional muster re-
gardless of the President’s statements.313 The Court’s main jus-
tification is judicial deference; immigration decisions should be 
made by the President and not by the courts.314 But why the 
principle of religious neutrality should apply only in some 
spheres and not others is unclear. It is notable that the majority 
disavows the analogy to the infamous Korematsu decision.315 The 
parallels are striking, which may explain the Court’s defensive-
ness. In Trump, like Korematsu, the evidence of ethnic or reli-
gious hostility is overwhelming, the national security justifica-
tion for the ban is weak, and the need for judicial deference is 
questionable.316 
It is not clear how much of the disparate results in Trump 
and Masterpiece Cakeshop is unconscious religious favoritism, 
though it is difficult to imagine an equivalent “Catholic ban” be-
ing upheld by a Court populated with a Catholic majority. Per-
haps this is too crude. Certainly, the Court has sometimes come 
to the aid of minority religions. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. 
City of Hialeah protected Santeria practitioners,317 and Holt v. 
Hobbs was a victory for a Muslim who wanted to wear a short 
beard in prison.318 But the political valence of recent Establish-
ment Clause decisions like Town of Greece and recent RFRA 
cases like Hobby Lobby suggests a rising Christian favoritism.319 
There is also a developing asymmetry in free exercise exemp-
tions. Legislatures that adopt exemptions for religious tradition-
alists who object to same-sex marriage are not also protecting 
 
clear case involving religious animus this past Term, it was not Masterpiece, but 
Trump v. Hawaii . . . . There has never been a case in which the Court was 
presented with more evidence of religious animus on the part of a single and 
final executive decisionmaker.”).  
 313. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2419 (2018). 
 314. Id. at 2418–20. 
 315. Id. at 2423. 
 316. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court 
Simultaneously Overturned and Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641 
(2019); Aziz Huq, The Travel Ban Decision Echoes Some of the Worst Supreme 
Court Decisions in History, VOX (June 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/the-big 
-idea/2018/6/26/17507014/travel-ban-internment-camp-supreme-court 
-korematsu-muslim-history [https://perma.cc/5Y79-8UY5]. 
 317. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 318. 574 U.S. 352 (2015). 
 319. Cf. Corbin, supra note 287; Tushnet, supra note 291, at 475–77.  
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the views of religious believers who favor equal treatment for 
those within the LGBT community.320  
A significant shift in the Court’s understanding of who 
counts as a “religious minority” has occurred. First, religious tra-
ditionalists, primarily white evangelical Christians, have repo-
sitioned themselves as an embattled cultural and political mi-
nority. In so doing, they have sought to sensitize the Court to 
their supposed marginal—even discrete and insular—status.321 
Second, religious traditionalists have taken up the language 
of multiculturalism conventionally used by ethnic and racial mi-
norities.322 Again, antiliberal theories provide ready sources of 
normative and legal argument. A standard claim is that liberal-
ism is too individualistic and cannot accommodate cultural or 
group pluralism.323 The liberal state treats all associations as 
voluntary and puts them on an equal footing.324 For critics, how-
ever, this account of how individuals experience social identity 
formation is too detached and fails to appreciate diversity, inclu-
sion, and the value of difference.325 Antiliberal critics complain 
about cultural flattening and moral conformity, framing their ar-
guments in terms of communal or associational pluralism.326  
The result is that when an LGBT couple files an antidiscrim-
ination complaint against a white evangelical Christian man, 
the latter assumes the role of the victim. Proponents of religious 
accommodation assert that the group of business owners that 
will engage in LGBT discrimination is relatively small. And they 
 
 320. See Leslie Griffin, Marriage Rights and Religious Exemptions in the 
United States, OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE 1, 14–15 (2017) (arguing that reli-
gious exemptions concerning same-sex marriage “threaten to re-establish reli-
gious marriage law by undermining the neutral marriage law that governs eve-
ryone equally”). 
 321. See Melissa Murray, Inverting Animus: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the 
New Minorities, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 282 (2018). 
 322. See id.  
 323. See supra Part II.C. 
 324. See supra Part II.C. 
 325. See supra Part II.C. 
 326. See, e.g., R.R. Reno, What Liberalism Lacks, FIRST THINGS (May 31, 
2019), https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2019/05/what-liberalism 
-lacks [https://perma.cc/C6QZ-LNCV] (criticizing “liberal monoculture”); cf. 
JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH 
DEEP DIFFERENCE 7 (2016) (advocating for “[c]onfident pluralism [that] allows 
genuine difference to coexist without suppressing or minimizing our firmly held 
convictions”). 
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claim that LGBT people should go elsewhere to be served for the 
sake of allowing an embattled group to preserve its cultural and 
religious identity.327 
That the actual exercise of social, economic, and political 
power in many places looks quite different does not seem to mat-
ter. Certainly, the triumph of President Trump—with his now 
fulfilled promise to ban Muslims and his flirtation with white 
Christian nationalism—should give us pause that we are wit-
nessing the liberal state’s destruction of a quaint and valuable 
cultural and religious minority.328  
Nevertheless, animus seems to be in the eye of the beholder. 
It is notable that a doctrine that has generally applied to ethnic, 
racial, sexual, and religious minorities—African-Americans and 
Muslims and other traditionally despised religious groups—is 
deployed by the Court to protect religious conservatives against 
a state enforcing a liberal norm of equal treatment. Although 
antidiscrimination laws are laws of general applicability, the 
Court purports to uncover animus to make an end-run around 
Smith. At the same time, however, Smith’s logic of neutrality is 
still available when the Justices want to enforce general laws 
that have a disparate religious impact, such as the travel ban, 
as long as they ignore the obvious religious hostility. When ap-
plied to Muslims, it appears that animus will be discounted or 
avoided, but when applied to traditionalist Christians, it will be 
magnified and made dispositive.  
This inconsistency, too, can be justified by an antiliberal 
view that requires the state to make a choice between competing 
religious worldviews. If animus toward religious traditionalists 
is already built into our liberal foundations—as antiliberal crit-
ics contend—animus doctrine itself has no foundation. The state 
should instead engage in cultural defense, protecting that which 
 
 327. See Douglas Laycock & Thomas Berg, Symposium: Masterpiece 
Cakeshop — Not as Narrow as May First Appear, SCOTUSBLOG (June 5, 2018, 
3:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-Masterpiece 
-cakeshop-not-as-narrow-as-may-first-appear [https://perma.cc/M3HQ-VZKW] 
(“Should conscientious objectors to same-sex marriage be protected from partic-
ipation in same-sex weddings? We still think they should, when the business is 
small and personal and ample alternative providers exist (as they nearly always 
do).”). 
 328. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Christian Legislative Prayers and Christian 
Nationalism, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 453 (2019). 
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is valuable and rejecting that which is not. Such a view easily 
degenerates into a form of Christian preferentialism.  
D. PRIVATE CHOICE  
In many of the Court’s Religion Clause decisions, the princi-
ple of government neutrality is accompanied by a principle of in-
dividual choice. These are related: government is neutral among 
religion, and between religion and non-religion, if private actors 
are free to make choices about how monies are spent or what 
religious activities to undertake. But, like the concepts of neu-
trality and equal treatment, the Court’s characterization of “pri-
vate choice” is manipulable. The line between state action and 
private decision shifts depending on how the Court characterizes 
the choice architecture of a given program. 
Consider four of the cases that we have been discussing: Zel-
man v. Simmons-Harris, Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, Town of 
Greece v. Galloway, and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. As already 
noted, Zelman is the Court’s central school funding case, which 
involved a voucher program in Cleveland that included religious 
schools.329 The Court held that the program was valid because 
the vouchers flowed to the parents of the children, and the par-
ents made the choice of where to direct the state funds.330 Be-
cause the money did not flow directly to religious schools, but 
arrived there only because of the parents’ “true private 
choice[s,]” the program did not run afoul of the Establishment 
Clause’s prohibition of direct funding for religious education.331 
Writing in dissent, Justice Souter observed that the parents’ 
“choices” were quite limited.332 No suburban-area Cleveland 
schools participated in the program.333 Moreover, the voucher 
amounts were so low that only religious schools in the city were 
realistic options for the program’s low-income students.334 In 
other words, despite purportedly applying across public and pri-
vate schools, the voucher program essentially subsidized only re-
ligious education.335 
 
 329. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 643–49 (2002). 
 330. Id. at 653–54.  
 331. Id.  
 332. Id. at 698–707 (Souter, J. dissenting).  
 333. Id. at 707.  
 334. Id. at 703–707.  
 335. Id.  
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Nevertheless, in Zelman, “choice” is the “circuit breaker” 
that turns the state action of government funding into the pri-
vate action of parental spending.336 Trinity Lutheran, which up-
held direct funding of church playground resurfacing, goes fur-
ther to suggest that all government grant programs that are 
structured without regard to religion or a specific religious pur-
pose will be deemed neutral.337 Indeed, Trinity Lutheran de-
mands that government programs not make distinctions be-
tween religious and nonreligious grantees in distributing public 
funding, even if that funding will be spent in ways that subsidize 
church facilities.338 On this theory, the government is not in the 
business of “funding” churches, but rather is distributing funds 
through grantees whose religious identification must be irrele-
vant as long as those grantees use the public money as author-
ized.339 Again, the grantee serves as a circuit breaker between 
the state and the money spent.  
In other words, choice turns state action into private action. 
Where there is a neutral government program that distributes 
public money through grantee recipients, the government is not 
establishing a church even when significant funding flows di-
rectly to churches and religious organizations. Rather, the gov-
ernment is funding certain priorities that churches too can pur-
sue—and in some cases, must be allowed to pursue.340  
In Town of Greece, the Court made a similar move to insu-
late government religious speech from Establishment Clause 
scrutiny. Again, choice architecture was central to the outcome 
in that case, in which an upstate New York town invited reli-
gious leaders from the community to offer prayers before the 
opening of town council meetings.341 The vast majority of those 
prayers were Christian and explicitly sectarian in nature.342 As 
the dissent observed, “[N]o one can fairly read the prayers from 
 
 336. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as 
Causative Agent in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167 
(2000). 
 337. Trinity Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25 
(2017).  
 338. Id. at 2030 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  
 339. Id. at 2024 (majority opinion).  
 340. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 222, at 927–29 (discussing application of 
the “circuit breaker” metaphor in Establishment Clause funding cases).  
 341. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). 
 342. Id. at 1816–17.  
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Greece’s Town meetings as anything other than explicitly Chris-
tian—constantly and exclusively so.”343 The vast majority of 
prayers offered over a decade invoked “Jesus Christ,” references 
to Christian scripture, and other sectarian language.344  
The Court, however, held that the choice to give such pray-
ers was not attributable to the government, which had merely 
established the procedure by which local religious leaders were 
invited to participate.345 That procedure excluded most non-
Christian religious groups, a result that Justice Alito dismissed 
as a mistake attributable to the inexperience of local government 
officials.346 As long as the procedure for picking religious denom-
inations was “neutral,” the religious leaders themselves could 
not be told what kinds of prayers to offer.347 Despite the fact that 
the prayers were given at the invitation of the town, on behalf of 
the town council, and in public session, the Court treated them 
as private speech. Indeed, the Court held that the government 
could not limit the ministers’ prayers without likely running 
afoul of speech and religious freedom guarantees.348 Like the 
vouchers at issue in Zelman, the “public” taint of the prayers was 
washed clean by the intervention of the religious leaders, who 
were—according to the Court—speaking for themselves.349  
Notably, choice architecture does not work in the opposite 
direction. In Hobby Lobby, the government argued that requir-
ing employers to include contraceptive coverage in their em-
ployee health care plans did not implicate those employers, who 
would not be making the decision whether to use services cov-
ered under those plans.350 The employer’s role was limited to de-
ciding whether to provide a health plan. If it did so, the health 
plan had to include certain services, which the employee could 
 
 343. Id. at 1848 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 1821–22 (majority opinion). 
 346. Id. at 1830–31 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 347. Id. at 1822–23 (majority opinion) (“Once it invites prayer into the public 
sphere, government must permit a prayer giver to address his or her own God 
or gods as conscience dictates, unfettered by what an administrator or judge 
considers to be nonsectarian.”). 
 348. Id. at 1822. 
 349. See id. at 1821–22, 1826.  
 350. Brief for the Petitioners at 33–34, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
573 U.S. 682 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 173486, at *33–34 (relying, in part, 
on Zelman to raise an attenuation objection to Hobby Lobby’s claim of substan-
tial burden under RFRA).  
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decide to use or not. The employer was not required to provide 
the services directly. The insurance plan covered a range of ser-
vices, and the employee would make the medical purchase.351 
The employee’s spending of money was, therefore, not attributa-
ble to the employer. After all, if an employee cashed her weekly 
paycheck and spent some of it on contraceptives, the employer 
would not be responsible.352 This is the concept of attenuation.353 
The Hobby Lobby Court, however, viewed the mandate as a 
compulsion and accepted the company’s argument that it was 
morally implicated in its employees’ decisions to use contracep-
tion—that the company itself was complicit in a religiously ob-
jectionable practice.354 Note how the taxpayers in Zelman and 
Trinity Lutheran and the citizens in Town of Greece are not af-
forded the same deference. In Zelman and Trinity Lutheran, tax-
payer monies subsidize the church mission, but the fact that the 
money is being directed by private parties means that the tax-
payers cannot complain. So, too, though sectarian prayers are 
being said at a town council meeting, those prayers are insulated 
from Establishment Clause scrutiny because they are not at-
tributable to the town or its citizens.  
Complicity is a morally and philosophically difficult con-
cept.355 The Court is loath to question the sincerity of religious 
claimants’ asserted beliefs.356 But on the Establishment Clause 
 
 351. Id. 
 352. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May 
(and Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 94, 146 (2017).  
 353. See Kent Greenawalt, Hobby Lobby: Its Flawed Interpretive Techniques 
and Standards of Application, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 
supra note 133, at 125, 140–41 (criticizing the Court’s treatment of the substan-
tial burden issue in Hobby Lobby for inadequately responding to the problem of 
attenuation). 
 354. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 724–27 (2014) (rejecting the government’s at-
tenuation argument against the existence of a substantial burden for purpose 
of applying RFRA).  
 355. We recognize, of course, that there are complex questions lurking here 
about how compelled subsidies, whether through mandates or other forms of 
regulation and taxation, are related to matters of speech and conscience. See 
Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 VA. L. REV. 317 (2011); 
Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Ex-
emptions in Hobby Lobby’s Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897 (2015); Nomi M. 
Stolzenberg, It’s About Money: The Fundamental Contradiction of Hobby Lobby, 
88 S. CAL. L. REV. 727 (2015).  
 356. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717–18. 
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side, citizens’ sincere religious or moral objections to funding 
churches or government religious speech are given little cre-
dence once the formalities of “neutral choice” are in place. On the 
free exercise side, by contrast, the distance between the reli-
giously objectionable practice and the claimant’s participation in 
that practice does not seem to matter. Government compulsion 
is always present even if decisions to engage in an objectionable 
practice are made by intermediaries. 
The sensitivity with which the Court approaches complicity 
claims concerning free exercise is not matched by a similar sen-
sitivity under the Establishment Clause. Procedures that put 
distance between money or speech through the mechanism of in-
dividual choice only function in one direction. State action can 
be turned into private action, immune from Establishment 
Clause scrutiny, while private action can be turned into state 
compulsion, requiring exemptions.  
This asymmetry raises a puzzle. Antiliberals regularly crit-
icize the overweening social welfare state, arguing that the post-
New Deal state is too controlling, destructive of private individ-
ual and associational life. But this anti-statism is selective. 
While some religious accommodationists refuse both the state’s 
money and its regulation, others seem content to accept the for-
mer while rejecting the latter. Freedom-enabling “choice” is the 
procedural device that justifies this inconsistency, but it imposes 
no meaningful constraint. Instead, the Court is drawing a pub-
lic/private distinction that implicates the state only when the 
state acts in ways contrary to the interests of those seeking gov-
ernment support for religion. 
Thus, in the Court’s emerging doctrine, individual “choice” 
becomes a mechanism for promoting religion. At some point, 
choice becomes so diluted that it ceases to mask the actual ends 
of the various policies at issue: prayer at town council meetings, 
deregulatory exemptions for religious employers, funding for re-
ligious schools. If the state’s preferred religious priorities are al-
ways advanced by choice, one has to question what work the con-
cept is doing.  
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IV.  THE FUTURE OF CHURCH AND STATE   
When doctrine collapses, what replaces it? Law is not auton-
omous; it is, in part, the function of social norms and conceptions 
of what is morally and politically possible. The constitutional 
doctrine of church and state is particularly fluid, as it seems to 
reflect, perhaps more than some other doctrinal areas, the polit-
ical moment in which it is developed.357  
Importantly for our purposes is what the present-day con-
fluence of antiliberal theory and antiliberal politics portends for 
the development of the Court’s church-state jurisprudence. As 
we have argued, equal treatment, neutrality, non-discrimina-
tion, animus, and private choice—in short, the language of lib-
eral principles—continue to be dominant in Religion Clause ad-
judication. That language, however, is losing its meaning at a 
moment when liberalism is under sustained attack.358 
Theory and politics are related. Liberalism’s critics are 
fairly candid about their doctrinal and policy aims. And history 
teaches that the Court’s understanding of principles like neu-
trality or equal treatment can be understood in political terms. 
For antiliberals, liberalism’s religious nature means that liberal 
 
 357. We have arrived at a historical-political moment in which the Court has 
legitimated the anti-Muslim initiative of a President who has expressed himself 
through clear and unrelenting tropes of religious and racial bigotry. See 
Moustafa Bayoumi, The Muslim Ban Ruling Legitimates Trump’s Bigotry, 
GUARDIAN (June 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
commentisfree/2018/jun/27/muslim-ban-ruling-trumps-bigotry [https://perma 
.cc/XXW7-L6JR]; see also Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 168 n.215 
(collecting judicial opinions describing President Trump’s anti-Muslim animus); 
David Leonhardt & Ian Prasad Philbrick, Donald Trump’s Racism: The Defini-
tive List, Updated, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2018/01/15/opinion/1410eonhardt-trump-racist.html 
[https://perma.cc/JY67-XBLZ] (compiling “a definitive list of [Trump’s] racist 
comments – or at least the publicly known ones”). In the same opinion that for-
mally rejected the racism of Korematsu, the Court asserted that it could not 
check the President’s action, even if some of the Justices wished that the Presi-
dent would speak in more inclusive and polite tones. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“There are numerous in-
stances in which the statements and actions of Government officials are not 
subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those officials 
are free to disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.”).  
 358. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. 
Ct. 1719, 1734 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); see also Kendrick & Schwartz-
man, supra note 5, at 143–46. 
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terminology should and must be reconfigured. We may be wit-
nessing a terminological change akin to the shift from Loch-
nerian equal treatment to equal protection after Brown v. Board 
of Education.359 
The rationale and rhetoric of the new church-state doctrine 
is already being formulated. It holds both that religion should be 
specially protected and also that government religious expres-
sion and justification is no different from secular expression and 
justification. It includes the following set of claims: 
(1) Religious freedom is the first freedom. Because freedom 
of religion precedes other freedoms, the protection of religious 
freedom cannot be weighed against harms from lifting regula-
tory burdens, even those regulatory burdens that are meant to 
enforce others’ basic rights.360 
(2) The state already funds competing conceptions of the 
good. To be consistent it must fund religious conceptions as well. 
The refusal to fund pervasively sectarian schools was histori-
cally anti-Catholic and continues to be suspect for that reason.361 
(3) The state already expresses support for competing con-
ceptions of the good. To be consistent, it must be allowed to ex-
press support for religious conceptions as well.362 
(4) The state already justifies laws, including coercive regu-
lations, on the basis of controversial secular reasons. To be con-
sistent, it must be allowed to justify laws and to coerce religious 
minorities and nonbelievers on the basis of controversial reli-
gious reasons.363 
 
 359. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938). 
 360. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Vio-
late the Establishment Clause?, 106 KY. L.J. 603 (2018).  
 361. See, e.g., Calabresi & Salander, supra note 271, at 1024–25. 
 362. In recent litigation over the Bladensburg Cross, the petitioners made a 
version of this argument to the Court. See Brief for the American Legion Peti-
tioners at 14, Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 
17-1717) (“[T]he endorsement test grants a heckler’s veto over speech support-
ive of religion that does not apply to any other form of government speech. Re-
stricting only religious speech singles out religious speech for discriminatory 
treatment and burdens that speech based on its content and viewpoint . . . .”). 
 363. See sources cited supra notes 83 and 227. While the new church-state 
doctrine may not go so far as to permit the state to coerce religious practice or 
ritual, it likely would permit religiously-motivated laws that regulate acts or 
behaviors that are closely related to one’s philosophical or religious views. With-
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What story can we tell about the political circumstances that 
have given rise to these kinds of claims and the doctrine that 
follows? One possible narrative asserts that increasing plural-
ism coupled with rising religious non-affiliation means that a re-
turn to a more assertive public cultural Christianity is un-
likely.364 Pluralism also means that the Catholic-Protestant 
conflicts that shaped the no-funding debates in the mid-twenti-
eth century are likely to be less strident, with non-preferential 
funding of the religious mission becoming less objectionable.365  
The terrain of the religious culture wars, however, continues 
to shift in unexpected directions. First, partly in response to the 
sexual revolution and the more recent recognition of LGBT 
rights, evangelicals, conservative Catholics, and other religious 
traditionalists have joined forces to defend a conception of reli-
gious liberty that they perceive to be under existential threat.366 
Second, the backlash against Muslim and other forms of ethnic 
migration has fueled the rise of Christian nationalism across 
western societies, including in the United States.367 These phe-
nomena have created fertile ground for an antiliberal revival, 
which in turn sets up the jurisprudential and political possibility 
for a more explicit and systematic regime of religious preferen-
tialism. Instead of dampening the aggressive assertion of Chris-
tian nationalism in the United States, pluralism may in fact be 
inducing it. We may be entering a reactionary period in the 
Court’s church-state jurisprudence. 
A. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES  
In thinking about the future trajectory of Religion Clause 
doctrine, we should start briefly by restating the standard ac-
count of its recent past. In their Political History of the Estab-
lishment Clause, John Jeffries and James Ryan describe a coali-
tional shift beginning in the 1970s and 1980s.368 That shift 
changed the jurisprudential politics of state support for religion, 
particularly in the education context where battles between 
 
out a secular purpose requirement, which has been heavily criticized by reli-
gious conservatives, the state would be permitted to adopt coercive laws justi-
fied solely on religious grounds.  
 364. See infra Part IV.A. 
 365. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 367–68. 
 366. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 367. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 368. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 327–52. 
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Catholics and Protestants had been most protracted.369 Previ-
ously, Protestants of all denominations were wary of state sup-
port because they opposed aid to Catholic parochial schools. The 
Court’s no-aid decisions, which began with Everson v. Board of 
Education in 1947 (the first modern Establishment Clause case) 
reflected this dominant view.370 The no-aid principle roughly co-
existed with a movement to eliminate religious observance in the 
public schools, which was embraced by the Court in the school 
prayer decisions of the early 1960s.371 Jews, Catholics, and sec-
ularists had been demanding the end to Protestant bible read-
ings in public schools at least since the late 1800’s when cities 
with large Catholic populations eliminated readings from the 
King James Bible.372  
Jeffries and Ryan argue that two occurrences have led to the 
withering of the no-aid position, even as the no-prayer consensus 
remains firm. First, white, southern Protestants, reacting to de-
segregation mandates following Brown v. Board of Education, 
retreated to private Christian academies as a means of avoiding 
integration. Their withdrawal from secular public schools and 
their desire for financial support for their new private schools 
moved mainly southern Protestants “to rethink their traditional 
opposition to aid to religious schools.”373 Second, and relatedly, 
as anti-Catholic animosity faded, American Protestantism be-
came increasingly divided.374 Mainline, northern, and racially 
progressive Protestantism found itself much more aligned with 
public secularists, while evangelical, fundamentalist, and 
mainly southern Protestants found themselves agreeing with 
conservative Catholics across a range of social issues.375  
The evangelicalization of the Republican Party is a crucial 
part of this story. Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973,376 but it was 
a decision by the IRS in 1975 to deny tax exempt status to ra-
cially discriminatory private schools—eventually affirmed by 
 
 369. See id. 
 370. 330 U.S. 1, 8–17 (1947).  
 371. See Abington Sch. Dist. V. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vi-
tale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 372. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 305–27. 
 373. Id. at 283. 
 374. Id. at 282. 
 375. Id. 
 376. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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the Court in Bob Jones University v. United States377—that ac-
celerated the Christian right’s mobilization.378 In any case, reli-
gious conservatives, especially in the South, were already an ob-
vious national political force by Ronald Reagan’s election in 
1980.379 They led the political and cultural backlash to abortion, 
contraception, women’s sexual liberation, and LGBT rights.380 
Running against a “liberal” Supreme Court, the Republican 
Party has repeatedly echoed these concerns.381 Since Reagan, it 
has endorsed the goal of returning prayer to the schools and 
providing large-scale financial assistance for private religious 
schools.382 The Court’s recent decisions certainly open the door 
to the latter. The no-aid principle has moved quickly toward a 
compulsory aid principle. 
Jeffries and Ryan’s narrative focuses on Establishment 
Clause cases, especially as related to schools.383 They have less 
to say about the cultural conflicts over public religious expres-
sion or religious exemptions. Both are in significant flux. Dis-
putes over public religious displays outside of schools have been 
relatively constant since the 1980s. Prior to Town of Greece, the 
most recent decision on public religious expression came in 2005 
with a pair of Ten Commandments cases that pointed in the op-
posite direction—one upholding a public monument and one 
striking down a government-sponsored display.384  
Notably, the religious coalition that found common cause 
with the Republican Party in the 1960s and 1970s was not par-
 
 377. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 378. See Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment 
Clause, 89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 637–39 (2011). 
 379. See BARRY HANKINS, AMERICAN EVANGELICALS: A CONTEMPORARY 
HISTORY OF A MAINSTREAM RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT 147–48 (2008); ALLEN D. 
HERTZKE, REPRESENTING GOD IN WASHINGTON 5 (1988). 
 380. Schragger, supra note 378, at 606–10. 
 381. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2544–52. 
 382. See REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 
12, 34 (2016), https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/ 
documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL[1]-ben_1468872234.pdf [https://perma.cc/ME25 
-ZJ43]. 
 383. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 281–84. 
 384. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding Ten Command-
ments display); McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (rejecting 
Ten Commandments display). 
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ticularly interested in free exercise exemptions. Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,385 the case that first applied heightened review to a gener-
ally applicable law burdening religious exercise, was decided in 
1963 without much fanfare.386 Wisconsin v. Yoder, decided in 
1972, held that the Old Order Amish need not comply with a 
state law that required children below the age of sixteen to at-
tend school.387 Yoder remains the high-water mark for judicially 
mandated religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment. 
It was only after the Supreme Court decided Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith388 
in 1990 that a broad coalition of liberals and conservatives raised 
concerns about the judicial approach to free exercise. Justice 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith was joined by most of his fel-
low conservatives. Justice Kennedy was in the majority. Justice 
O’Connor, a relative moderate, dissented from Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning but concurred in the judgment.389 Yet the political re-
sponse was swift and unified. In a strong showing of bipartisan-
ship, and with near unanimity, Congress passed the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, which President Clinton signed into 
law in 1993.390 RFRA reinstated the compelling interest test that 
the Court had applied in Sherbert and Yoder.391 Supported by 
the ACLU and the Southern Baptist Convention and everyone 
in-between, it represented a brief moment of political consensus 
in matters of religious freedom.392  
B. RISE OF ANTILIBERAL POLITICS  
Writing in 2001, Jeffries and Ryan predicted the Supreme 
Court’s 2002 decision in Zelman v. Harris, though they did not 
anticipate the Court moving so quickly from a no-aid position to 
 
 385. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
 386. See De’Siree N. Reeves, Missing Link: The Origin of Sherbert and the 
Irony of Religious Equality, 15 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 201 (2019). 
 387. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 388. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 389. Id. at 892–908. 
 390. See Martin S. Lederman, Reconstructing RFRA: The Contested Legacy 
of Religious Freedom Restoration, 125 YALE L.J.F. 416, 416 (2016); see also 
Schragger, supra note 378, at 608–09. 
 391. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012). 
 392. See Lupu, supra note 248, at 54–55.  
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compulsory aid in Trinity Lutheran.393 They also predicted that 
America’s increasing religious pluralism would prevent a return 
to school prayer and the embrace of a more aggressive public 
Christianity.394  
Both of these predictions turn on a similar narrative of reli-
gious pluralism, a story of how the Protestant-Catholic tensions 
of a prior era gave way to a panoply of religious groups—some 
Christian, some not—seeking and receiving government aid. In 
a highly pluralistic environment, religious groups receiving gov-
ernment funding might seem no more threatening than when 
nonreligious groups receive it. At the same time, pluralism 
works against school prayer or other forms of public religious ex-
pression. The multiplicity of religious views in society makes re-
ligious preferentialism particularly problematic.  
Jeffries and Ryan’s story ends a bit too soon, however. Writ-
ing today, one would have to place the debate over free exercise 
exemptions at the center of any account of the political economy 
of church and state. Moreover, one might not be as certain about 
the effects of pluralism on judicial decisions regarding school 
prayer or other forms of public religious expression. Two devel-
opments have destabilized church-state politics in the United 
States since the turn of the twenty-first century. The first is the 
resurgent conservative backlash against the sexual revolution 
with its increasingly militant opposition to abortion, contracep-
tion, and the LGBT civil rights movement.395 The second is the 
global response to Islamic fundamentalism, with its concomitant 




 393. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 28, at 367. 
 394. Id. at 367–68. 
 395. See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 6, at 2544–52. 
 396. See Richard C. Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employ-
ment Division v. Smith: Same-Sex Marriage, the “War on Terror,” and Religious 
Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2009 (2011). 
  
2020] RELIGIOUS ANTILIBERALISM 1417 
 
1. The Sexual Revolution and LGBT Backlash 
Abortion politics obviously play a role in Jeffries and Ryan’s 
political economy of the Religion Clauses, but it is a relatively 
minor one. Their account focuses on the funding of private reli-
gious schools. At the time of their writing, the relative solidity of 
Roe v. Wade397 was in some ways taken for granted.  
The political union of religious conservatives has only grown 
stronger in the last two decades, however. One flashpoint has 
been the inclusion of contraception as part of mandatory health 
insurance coverage under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).398 The 
ACA encountered significant political resistance, including from 
those with traditional religious views. That resistance met with 
success in the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, which 
read RFRA expansively in granting exemptions to large for-
profit corporations.399 The Trump administration has granted 
further exemptions to religious and nonreligious employers who 
object to providing contraceptive coverage,400 as well as to health 
care workers with conscientious objections to participating in a 
wide range of medical practices.401  
In addition, the appointment of Justice Kavanaugh to the 
Supreme Court has given anti-abortion forces greater optimism 
about overturning Roe.402 At least nine states have recently 
adopted laws criminalizing abortion—at least six without a rape 
 
 397. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 398. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 399. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
 400. See Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019) (up-
holding nationwide injunction blocking Trump Administration regulations ex-
panding religious exemptions to the Affordable Care Act); Religious Exemptions 
and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017). 
 401. Margot Sanger-Katz, Trump Administration Strengthens “Conscience 
Rule” for Health Care Providers, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www 
.nytimes.com/2019/05/02/upshot/conscience-rule-trump-religious-exemption 
-health-care.html [https://perma.cc/489K-7NL6]. 
 402. See, e.g., David Crary, States Pushing Near-Bans on Abortion, Target-
ing Roe v. Wade, AP NEWS (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/ 
3a9b3bc0e14d47aa8691aca84c32f391 [https://perma.cc/89QP-RV39]; K.K. Re-
becca Lai, Abortion Bans: 9 States Have Passed Bills To Limit the Procedure 
This Year, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2019/us/abortion-laws-states.html [https://perma.cc/D9R5-6MXU]. 
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or incest exception403—in anticipation that the Supreme Court 
will use such laws as vehicles to reverse decades of precedent.  
Increasingly, anti-abortion and anti-contraception politics 
are linked. A consistent trope of religious antiliberalism is the 
identification of sexual licentiousness with liberalism.404 An ex-
ample is the association of liberalism with paganism and the as-
sociation of paganism with the sexual rituals and mores of pa-
gans.405 The conservative resistance to sexual liberation has 
been constant, but its more recent formulations sometimes 
equate sexual autonomy and reproductive rights with the larger 
demographic implosion of Western civilization—the problem of 
low birth rates for “native whites.”406  
Conservative hostility toward sexual autonomy is also re-
flected in opposition to the LGBT civil rights struggle. The cam-
paign for LGBT marriage equality, culminating in the Court’s 
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,407 has produced a political back-
lash from religious traditionalists, further cementing the exist-
ing counter-cultural alliance of conservative Catholics, evangel-
icals, fundamentalist Christians, and other conservative 
religious denominations. As Masterpiece Cakeshop illustrates, 
the demand for religious exemptions from laws mandating equal 
treatment of LGBT people has become a central point of con-
flict.408 The response to LGBT rights is shaping, and in many 
ways distorting, the law of free exercise.409 It has engendered a 
divisive politics very different from the politics that existed when 
RFRA was passed by a virtually unanimous Congress.  
 
 403. See, e.g., Mara Gordon & Alyson Hurt, Early Abortion Bans: Which 
States Have Passed Them?, NPR NEWS (June 5, 2019), https://www.npr.org/ 
sections/health-shots/2019/06/05/729753903/early-abortion-bans-which-states 
-have-passed-them [https://perma.cc/WKC3-KP2B]. 
 404. See supra Part II. 
 405. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 285–89. 
 406. See, e.g., PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST: HOW DYING 
POPULATIONS AND IMMIGRANT INVASIONS IMPERIL OUR COUNTRY AND CIVILI-
ZATION (2002).  
 407. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
 408. See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR COM-
MON GROUND (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019); 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas 
Laycock et al. eds., 2008). 
 409. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 146 (arguing that the 
Masterpiece Court distorted animus doctrine in holding that the state violated 
the principle of religious neutrality).  
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Obergefell itself rejected a legal disability on LGBT people 
that could only be justified on the basis of religious beliefs.410 At 
the oral argument in the Supreme Court, as in lower courts, the 
states struggled to justify marriage exclusion in terms that all 
citizens could reasonably accept.411 Their theory that expanding 
civil marriage would weaken a conception of marriage linked to 
procreation, and thereby lead opposite-sex couples to remain un-
married, was nonsensical. In this way, Obergefell represents a 
significant step in the broader liberal project; it rejects reliance 
on religious reasons for lawmaking, no matter how widely 
shared.412 Obergefell is also continuous with the general civil 
rights project, the expansion of equal treatment to once-margin-
alized persons.  
For both these reasons, the counter-cultural reaction to 
Obergefell has been fairly intense, with religious traditionalists 
arguing that Obergefell represents the end of religious freedom, 
a central effort by the state to stamp out dissenting voices from 
the liberal orthodoxy. When advocates of LGBT rights counter 
that appeals to rights of religious conscience were also used to 
justify racial segregation and discrimination, those seeking reli-
gious exemptions to equal treatment guarantees insist that 
LGBT rights differ from African-American civil rights.413 Most 
 
 410. See Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, Oberge-
fell and the End of Religious Reasons for Lawmaking, RELIGION & POL. (June 
29, 2015), https://religionandpolitics.org/2015/06/29/obergefell-and-the-end-of 
-religious-reasons-for-lawmaking/ [https://perma.cc/DQ8D-NTKV]. 
 411. Id. 
 412. But see Gregg Strauss, What’s Wrong with Obergefell, 40 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 631 (2018) (arguing that while Obergefell rejected appeals to religious rea-
sons, it nevertheless relied improperly on secular nonpublic reasons in violation 
of the demands of a liberal principle of legitimacy).  
 413. Douglas Laycock, The Campaign Against Religious Liberty, in RISE OF 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 133, at 231, 252; Steven D. Smith, 
Against “Civil Rights” Simplism: How Not To Accommodate Compelling Legal 
Commitments, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, LGBT RIGHTS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR 
COMMON GROUND, supra note 408, at 233; Robin Fretwell Wilson, Matters of 
Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage from the Healthcare Context, in 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS, supra 
note 408, at 77, 101. But see Carlos A. Ball, Against LGBT Exceptionalism in 
Religious Exemptions from Antidiscrimination Obligations, 31 J.C.R. & ECON. 
DEV. 233, 239–42 (2018) (“[T]here is no good reason, in the context of LGBT 
issues, to depart in significant ways from how anti-discrimination law has in 
the past accommodated religious dissenters in the context of race and gender.”); 
Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 160–61 (criticizing rejections of the 
race analogy in the context of religious exemptions). 
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concede that racial discrimination is beyond the pale no matter 
its religious provenance. But some argue that opposition to 
same-sex marriage is both a religious belief that is worthy of re-
spect and a legitimate basis for denying LGBT persons equal 
treatment.414 The latter move undercuts the equal rights project 
itself, for it permits public-facing discrimination despite the se-
rious harm it causes: the elimination of equal citizenship rights 
that are the basis for LGBT participation in the political and eco-
nomic life of the nation.415  
The backlash to Obergefell raises some questions about the 
application of the pluralist account of twentieth century church-
state politics. Protestant-Catholic conflict characterized the mid-
twentieth century church-state equilibrium. But in the twenty-
first century, the conflict is between religious traditionalists and 
progressives, both secular or religious. Religious traditionalists 
reject the notion that same-sex marriage does not implicate their 
way of life. They argue that Obergefell represents a liberal con-
ception of family, marriage, sex, procreation, and sexuality that 
is imposed directly upon them and in ways they cannot avoid.  
For LGBT persons seeking equal rights, meanwhile, plural-
ism is only plausible on equal terms. Lending judicial legitimacy 
to the refusal to provide equal services in the marketplace marks 
LGBT people as permanently second-class. Religious pluralism 
does not solve this seeming zero-sum battle. Multiplicity—reli-
gious, ethnic, sexual or otherwise—cannot mute the on-going 
fight for recognition. It is partly for this reason that the political 
consensus that led to RFRA’s passage has fragmented and can-
not be recovered today. 
2. Islamophobia 
A similar zero-sum fight seems to characterize the Western 
reaction to fundamentalist Islam—the second feature of twenty-
first century church-state politics. Global church-state politics 
has had an increasingly ethno-religious cast. Consider European 
countries that have banned the hijab or the building of minarets 
 
 414. See Laycock, supra note 413, at 242–46.  
 415. See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 5, at 158–60 (criticizing the 
claim advanced by the plaintiff in Masterpiece that dignitary harms are not 
compelling interests for purposes of upholding civil rights laws against free ex-
ercise challenge); Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions and 
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or have reasserted the need and value of Christian symbols, like 
the cross, in public places.416 Consider, more pointedly, countries 
like Hungary and Poland that are promoting the practices and 
institutions of an ethno-religious state. There, opposition to Is-
lam has become a defining characteristic of religious, ethnic, and 
political identity. Islamophobia has been accompanied by a re-
surgence of Christian nativism.417 
Left- and right-leaning commentators point to the rising tide 
of nationalist and reactionary politics as an indication of the cri-
sis of liberalism.418 Some argue that the failure of Western reli-
gious toleration suggests a serious blindness at the center of the 
liberal project. That blindness manifests as an inability to come 
to terms with illiberal religions in general and especially with 
Islam as it is practiced in the West. On the left, critics point out 
the hypocrisy of Western nations that preach toleration but 
adopt policies of exclusion and denigration.419 On the right, mass 
Muslim immigration to the West is used to justify support for 
more robust Christian societies, with conservatives and an-
tiliberals arguing that Christian national identity must be as-
serted more forcefully to counter the rise of Islam.420 
This latter impulse suggests how the Jeffries and Ryan plu-
ralism thesis might be mistaken. Indeed, it suggests how an in-
crease in Western religious pluralism might lead to more public 
 
 416. See CÉCILE LABORDE, CRITICAL REPUBLICANISM: THE HIJAB CONTRO-
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 417. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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 419. See Susanna Mancini, The Tempting of Europe, the Political Seduction 
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VIVAL 111–35 (Susanna Mancini & Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2014). 
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religiosity and private suppression rather than less. The per-
ceived Islamic threat leads to calls to ban religious sites, outlaw 
Islamic law, enforce restrictions on religious dress, or require 
outward assertions of fealty to Christian symbols.421 Instead of 
resulting in less public support for official displays of Christian-
ity, existing forms of pluralism have produced a popular back-
lash in the form of a more full-throated defense of Christian (or 
“Judeo-Christian”) values and a concomitant reassertion of those 
values in public, up to and including coercing compliance with 
traditionalist norms.  
President Trump’s Muslim ban represents this assertion of 
Christian nationalism,422 in parallel with the practices of right-
wing parties throughout Europe to restrict or eliminate immi-
gration from the Middle East and to shut the door to Muslim 
refugees and asylum seekers. Controlling entry is a way of short-
circuiting ethnic and religious pluralism and is part of a larger 
explicit agenda—now fully embraced by the Republican Party—
of preserving an imagined American identity in the face of per-
ceived ethnic and religious attack.  
Anti-immigrant nativism has a long history, in the United 
States as elsewhere. In a previous century, it was mainly anti-
Catholic but also anti-Jewish.423 Jeffries and Ryan are correct 
that the Protestant reaction to Catholicism and to desegregation 
played an important role in the Supreme Court’s approach to the 
Establishment Clause. In the twenty-first century, we are al-
ready witnessing the effect of anti-Islamic nativism in shaping 
church-state doctrine at the Court.424  
 
 421. See, e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce & Steven Erlanger, Swiss Ban Building 
of Minarets on Mosques, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2009), https://www.nytimes 
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 422. See Corbin, supra note 328, at 472–73. 
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 424. In addition to the Muslim ban, consider the Court’s recent rejection of 
an Islamic prisoner’s Establishment Clause challenge to Alabama’s practice of 
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C. THE COLLAPSE OF SEPARATIONISM 
What is the relationship between antiliberal theory and il-
liberal politics? Religious antiliberals need not embrace nativism 
or Trumpian populism. Indeed, antiliberals often blame liberal-
ism for the rise of authoritarian regimes. Whether antiliberal 
theory nevertheless exhibits an historical affinity with authori-
tarianism or has the capacity to counter authoritarian regimes 
are questions that we cannot address here.425 
What we can say is that in the context of American church-
state politics, left and right antiliberal theories point away from 
the mid-twentieth century separationist settlement.426 Moreo-
ver, as exhibited in the United States, religious antiliberalism 
tends to be socially conservative.427 Much of the new antiliberal-
ism advocates a church-state doctrine that involves: (1) broad 
autonomy for religious institutions and persons through robust 
religious exemptions from general laws; (2) public funding of 
churches and religious organizations through vouchers or direct 
grants on par with secular institutions; (3) acceptance of majori-
tarian public religious expression and displays, including in 
some cases, a return to school prayer; and (4) the legitimacy of 
state-enforced moral codes based on religious principles.428 
 This set of commitments reflects a socially conservative po-
litical program. To the extent critiques of liberalism are associ-
ated with a certain form of mid-twentieth century church-state 
separationism, this program is also a challenge to liberalism. An-
tiliberal theory is a resource and justification for rejecting core 
aspects of Religion Clause jurisprudence. 
The doctrine has already shifted, as we have argued. And 
the composition of the Supreme Court matters. Justices Alito 
and Gorsuch are undoubtedly aware of the deep critiques of lib-
eralism; they have been a staple of conservative intellectual dis-
course for a generation. And with the addition of Justice Ka-
vanaugh, it seems likely there will be five votes for an expansive 
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reading of RFRA and Masterpiece Cakeshop’s free exercise hold-
ing. Under either theory, religious individuals, groups, and cor-
porations will be entitled to exemptions from a whole panoply of 
federal and state laws, including civil rights laws. It also seems 
likely that Trinity Lutheran will be applied to many other forms 
of government funding, thus embedding a doctrinal principle of 
compulsory aid to churches and religious organizations on equal 
terms with secular equivalents.429  
And finally, it seems likely that restrictions on government 
expressions of sectarian religiosity in the public sphere will be 
relaxed.430 A number of Justices have already signaled their re-
jection of the endorsement test, with some favoring a coercion-
based approach instead.431 On that account, any symbolic activ-
ity of government, as long as it falls short of coercing religious 
practice, or perhaps proselytizing, would not constitute an Es-
tablishment Clause violation. Some versions of a coercion test 
would permit compulsory school prayer, perhaps with an opt-out 
for dissenters. With a doctrinal path cleared for state-sponsored 
religious exercise, changes in public culture under such a test 
could be profound.432  
D. THE COMING INTRA-CONSERVATIVE DEBATE 
On a majority conservative Court, the debate over church 
and state will be intramural. Rhetorically, liberalism will con-
tinue to prevail. The language of neutrality, non-discrimination, 
equal treatment, and animus will be deployed by the Justices 
despite the increasing incoherence of those terms. The question 
for the Justices is whether they can construct workable alterna-
tives to the application of these liberal principles, which religious 
antiliberals argue have been corrupt since their inception. As 
power shifts rightward on the Court, the question is how far the 
Court will go in dismantling the separationist regime.  
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An emerging debate on the political right is between those 
who would retain some features of a basic liberal regime and 
those who would jettison liberalism altogether. Those who seek 
to retain a basic neutrality principle, no matter how weakly en-
forced, are not yet prepared to embrace a religious state, though 
they sometimes will argue that such a state can meet the mini-
mal requirements of liberal legitimacy.433 Others are not at all 
concerned with liberal pieties. For antiliberals like Smith and 
Vermeule, liberalism, secularism, and paganism are all opposed 
to Christianity. For these thinkers, transcendent authority and 
moral truth are embodied in the traditions of the Church (or, 
perhaps, churches) and are respected and sustained in the reli-
gious culture of a Christian society and, if possible, a Christian 
state.434 Liberalism is not a framework for fair competition, but 
rather a totalizing value system that requires conformity with 
its own ethics, liturgy, and rituals. The answer to liberalism is 
not to demand a more modest version of it, but to uproot it en-
tirely, or as much as possible, in favor of a perfectionist religious 
society, governed by a religiously-integrated state.435  
This intra-conservative debate has only recently broken 
through to popular conservative media, in which religious an-
tiliberals, or those sympathetic to them, have attacked more 
mainstream religious conservatives for their continued adher-
ence to the basic tenets of liberal democracy.436 An authoritarian 
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Christian state, following the rise of “illiberal democracy” in 
Hungary and Poland, seems to be the preferred model.437  
The judicial debate will undoubtedly be more muted and less 
radical. The disestablishment norm is simply too well en-
trenched. But what about a kind of quasi-Christian or “Judeo-
Christian” preferentialism coupled with relatively favorable 
treatment of traditionalist Christians and relatively unfavorable 
treatment of religious minorities, in particular, Muslims? We are 
witnessing such regimes already. 
There is no reason to believe that the United States is im-
mune from the political forces that have put pressure on liberal 
regimes around the world. The backlash against religious toler-
ation and multiculturalism, along with the assertion of religious 
and ethnic chauvinism, is apparent throughout Europe, in the 
Islamic world, and elsewhere. A Court that has released the 
brakes on such expressions may encourage such illiberal move-
ments. It has been a challenge to protect and defend the institu-
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tions of political liberalism at the turn of the twenty-first cen-
tury. But with the revival of religious antiliberalism, and espe-
cially virulent forms of it, liberalism will also need renewed phil-
osophical and theoretical support as well. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Contemporary religious antiliberalism targets the whole of 
the liberal tradition. But it has particular resonance in the arena 
of church and state. Antiliberals argue that the secular/religious 
divide is a false one, like the public/private distinction, and that 
both are intended to and have the effect of marginalizing reli-
gious believers. Religious antiliberals contend that privatization 
of religion is a distinctly Protestant imposition and that the de-
mands of public reason alienate and discriminate against reli-
gious believers. They further argue that society is split between 
two cultural forces that are equally “religious”—Christians and 
pagans. Despite assertions to the contrary, they claim liberalism 
imposes a suffocating uniformity of thought and belief, forcing 
ever-more narrowly constrained liberties for those who reject lib-
eral values.  
Framed as a response to liberal repression, antiliberalism 
comes in various forms. For some, the answer is localism, or per-
haps retreat into utopian enclaves.438 And for others, the proper 
response to liberalism must be the resurrection of a Christian 
society and the establishment of a state subordinate to the 
Church.439 These antiliberal strategies are being promulgated by 
philosophers, political theorists, and legal scholars. And they are 
being debated at a moment when the doctrine of church and 
state is in considerable flux. It is in flux politically as the Court’s 
composition shifts, and it is in flux conceptually as the doctrinal 
tools that serve to justify case outcomes are losing their elastic-
ity.  
The Court will not explicitly embrace antiliberal rhetoric. 
But it may be influenced by the core claims made by religious 
antiliberals, who expand the range of thinkable political and le-
gal possibilities. Either way, it is important to observe the sim-
ultaneous reemergence of an antiliberal intellectual movement 
and the rise of illiberal political regimes. The latter is already 
reflected in the Court’s jurisprudence of church and state, and it 
 
 438. See supra Part II.C. 
 439. See supra Part II.D. 
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will likely be justified by the former, even while being clothed in 
the language of liberal principles. We are at a moment of inflec-
tion. An emerging conservative Supreme Court arrives when 
Western liberalism has shown itself to be vulnerable to populist 
and authoritarian forces. Religious antiliberalism is encouraging 
a cultural and political movement toward Christian preferential-
ism. And the constitutional doctrine of church and state in the 
United States is beginning to follow. 
 
